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Abstract
Oddballs—low-probability, attention-capturing expectancy violations—are judged as
longer than non-oddballs, but are temporal intervals that contain oddballs judged as longer than
those that do not? In 2 experiments, we tested competing model predictions using a novel and
covert measure of subjective duration—musical imagery reproduction. Participants verbally
estimated and reproduced with musical imagery repeated, coherent, or incoherent familiar or
unfamiliar chord sequences (3.5 s, 7 s, or 12 s) that either did or did not contain dynamic
auditory oddballs. Participants verbally estimated repeated chord sequences that contained
oddballs as shorter than those that did not, but reproduced with musical imagery incoherent
chord sequences that contained oddballs as longer than those that did not. These findings suggest
that (a) intervals that contain attention-capturing, high-priority events are judged as shorter than
those that do not when people are engaged in relatively temporal information processing, but as
longer than those that do not when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information
processing, and (b) temporal and nontemporal information processing are interdependent. These
results support the resource allocation model of short interval time estimation. We discuss
implications for attention- and memory-based models, dynamic attending theory, and the
ongoing debate about the mechanisms driving the temporal oddball illusion.
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Introduction
Psychological Time
Psychological time is a puzzling concept. How can something as illusory and intangible
as time play such a critical role in our lives? This question has mystified philosophers for ages.
Relatively recent empirical discoveries suggest that psychological time is a cognitive
construction based on perceived and remembered change (Bertotti & Easthope, 1978; Block,
1990; Fraisse, 1963). Change can characterized by continuous or discrete, and sensory or
organismic, events (Poynter, 1989). People can track continuous sensory events like planet orbits
to measure time’s passage on the scale of years, or discrete sensory events like clock ticks, finger
taps, and musical beats to measure time’s passage on the scale of seconds. We cannot perceive
time, itself, but we can form representations of it.
Information Processing
Psychological time is as illusory as it is susceptible to distortion. Block (1990) articulated
four overarching factors that work together to distort psychological time: (1) individual
differences, (2) the type of time judgment being made about a temporal interval, (3) the content
that fills that interval, and (4) the type of information processing in which people engage during
that interval.
Examples of individual differences include species, age, sex, cultural background, and
personality. Examples of types of time judgments include order, succession, and duration. By
“the content that fills an interval,” Block (1990) means everything that occurs during a given
interval of time. This might include many types of events and processes. Some are internal—
thoughts, feelings, neurological activity—and some are external, like tastes, lights, smells, and
other sensory stimulation. Furthermore, these events and processes can have characteristics that
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vary in quantity, complexity, structure, and predictability—in how many there are, how complex
they are, how they are organized, and the degree to which they confirm or violate expectations.
The type of information processing in which people engage during an interval can, for
instance, be relatively temporal or nontemporal. People engage in relatively temporal
information processing when attending to temporal information, such as the ticks of a clock, or
the rhythm of a song. On the other hand, people engage in relatively nontemporal information
processing when attending to nontemporal information, such as the color of a clock, or the
loudness of a song.
Everyday stimuli include both temporal and nontemporal information. Speech, for
example, is characterized by temporal information, such as the length of words and inter-onset
intervals (IOI; the durations between event onsets), or the rhythmic stress beats of sentences
(Allen, 1972). But speech is also characterized by nontemporal information, ranging from vocal
timbre to pitch intervals (Boltz, 1999). Both temporal and nontemporal information affect the
perception of speech stimuli (Grosjean, 1980).
In music, the relationship between temporal and nontemporal information is underscored.
Music consists of temporal information—rhythms change over time, and the orderings of notes
change over time. Plenty of nontemporal information exists, as well, such as timbres, amplitudes,
pitches, and pitch contours. The ways in which nontemporal information is temporally organized
in music is vital. Temporal information plays a key role in the perception of nontemporal
properties, despite the fact that these nontempora properties are, themselves, nontemporal
(Rosen, 1992).
Attending to temporal information can mean focusing on the rhythm of your favorite
song, or simply tracking the passage of time (e.g., by counting seconds, foot taps, heart beats, or
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exhalations). People engage in relatively temporal information processing when researchers
explicitly draw people’s attention to the passage of time, or when researchers present people with
stimulus sequences that are structured in predictable ways—predictable event structures are
processed relatively efficiently and free attentional resources to monitor the passage of time.
On the other hand, attending to relatively nontemporal information can mean focusing on
the texture of your favorite shirt, or doing things that distract you from noticing the passage of
time. People engage in relatively nontemporal information processing in time estimation
experiments where researchers intentionally avoid stating duration, aiming to prevent people
from noticing, attending to, or monitoring the passage of time. People also engage in
nontemporal information processing when presented with stimuli featuring unpredictable event
structures. Unpredictable event structures consume attentional resources and distract people from
tracking, or even noticing, the passage of time.
Boltz (1998) investigated the role of temporal and nontemporal information processing
on subjective duration in the context of music. Boltz manipulated whether melodies were
structurally coherent or incoherent—whether or not the temporal information (rhythms) and
nontemporal information (pitches) of the melodies were compatible. She manipulated the degree
to which people were engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing by
instructing them to either attend to the melodies’ pitch properties (nontemporal information),
total durations (temporal information), or both; another group was given no attending
instructions.
Boltz (1998) found that incoherent melodies were judged as longer than coherent ones
when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (pitch alone; no
attending in experiment 2), but not when people were engaged in relatively temporal information
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processing (duration alone; rhythm alone). Incoherent melodies were judged as shorter than
coherent ones when people were attempting to engage in both temporal and nontemporal
information processing. This finding was considered an interference effect, where increased in
processing load shortened subjective duration; interference effects are robust in the time
estimation literature (Brown, 1997), and emerge when attentional resources are taxed and mental
workload is high (see Simchy-Gross & Margulis, 2014, 2015). Boltz’s findings highlight the
complex relationship between musical event structure, information processing, and subjective
duration. Incoherent event structures can both lengthen and shorten subjective duration, and it
depends on whether people are engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information
processing.
Event Structure and Information Processing
Music and expectation. Organisms possess great varieties of learned and unlearned
expectations—music happens to thrive on their exploitation. Music constantly taunts and teases
our sense of knowing what comes next, our involuntary physiological processes that prepare us
for future events, our anticipatory responses to things that either confirm, violate, or delay
predictions. Expectancy manipulations shape musical experiences—whether listening,
imagining, or performing (see Huron, 2006; Huron & Margulis, 2010).
Musical expectancies fall into two broad categories: schematic and veridical (Bharucha,
1987, 1994; Justus & Bharucha, 2001). Schematic expectations are formed by experiencing
patterns in the environment over extensive amounts of time, and they inform predictions about
general things in broad categories. Schematic expectations always operate automatically, though
they can range in depth, and involve relatively conscious and unconscious processing (Margulis,
2005, 2007).

5
Veridical expectations, on the other hand, are formed by observing patterns in the
environment over short periods of time, and they inform predictions about specific things in
particular situations. Veridical expectations make unfamiliar music familiar after relatively few
exposures. If you hear an unfamiliar song play 12 times on the radio over the course of an hourlong road trip, for instance, that song—and the sequential orderings of its musical events—will
be veridically familiar by the time you arrive at your destination.
To illustrate further, consider this: A sequence of letters listed alphabetically is more
schematically predictable than that of a sequence of letters listed randomly. The alphabetical list
confirms expectations for which we have strong schemas, rooted in years of exposure and
rehearsal. Similarly, for an American, the Y symbol is more schematically predictable than the ¥
symbol, because of longstanding exposure.
Now, consider a situation where this American is presented with eight symbols in a row,
followed by a ninth symbol. Following a sequence of eight ¥ symbols, a ninth ¥ symbol will be
less schematically predictable, yet more veridically predictable, than a ninth Y symbol.
Schematic expectations continue to favor the occurrence of the ordinary Y, but veridical
expectations favor the repetition of the locally established ¥.
Schematic and veridical expectations can, and often do, contradict one another. A good
musical example of this comes from the deceptive cadence. Deceptive cadences violate
schematic expectations, but can do so while simultaneously confirming veridical expectations.
Deceptive cadences violate the schematic expectation that musical passages close on the tonic (a
harmony built on the first scale degree). But this violation can occur while simultaneously
confirming a well-learned veridical expectation that a particular passage closes on the
submediant (a harmony built on the sixth scale degree).
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Deceptive cadences violate schematic expectancies about harmonic phrase closure,
regardless of veridical predictability. Hearing a song 12 times can make deceptive cadences
veridically familiar, for instance, but those familiar deceptive cadences nevertheless remain
schematically surprising. Even our favorite songs backed with years of repeated listenings
continually surprise us. This type of persistent schematic surprise in the face of veridical
familiarity keeps music from getting boring; repetition, in fact, has been shown to make music
more engaging, more interesting, more enjoyable, and even more musical (Margulis, 2014;
Margulis & Simchy-Gross, 2016).
Chord sequences. A practical and effective way to manipulate musical expectations is to
vary the event structure of chord sequences. Chord sequences can be ordered in relatively
predictable or unpredictable ways. Predictable chord sequences facilitate temporal information
processing, and unpredictable ones facilitate nontemporal information processing. Repeated
chord sequences (a single chord presented multiple times), for instance, are predictable—their
patterns are easy to abstract. We are accustomed to processing repeated stimuli in daily life—
most things usually stay the same (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015). Repeated chord sequences facilitate
temporal information processing because they afford listeners plenty of attention to devote to
temporal information and track the passage of time. Coherent chord sequences are also relatively
predictable. Coherent chord sequences are ordered in ways that confirm well-learned musical
expectations and follow the rules of standard tonal harmony. In contrast to both repeated and
coherent chord sequences, incoherent chord sequences are relatively unpredictable. Incoherent
chord sequences are ordered in ways that violate well-learned musical expectations. Incoherent
chord sequences disobey the rules of standard tonal harmony. Incoherent chord sequences
facilitate relatively nontemporal information processing. When presented with incoherent chord
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sequences, people are too occupied trying to make sense of the musical twists, turns, and
violations to devote any meaningful amount of attention to temporal information or the
monitoring of time.
Although both repeated and coherent sequences are relatively predictable, different
processes underlie their perceptions (Huettel, Mack, & McCarthy, 2002). Repetition produces
extraordinary perceptual and cognitive effects, enhancing encoding efficiency, predictive
attending, and entrainment (Margulis, 2014). Repeated sequences are efficiently processed and
easily stored in memory (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). Repeated sequences facilitate
stimulus identification (Bybee, 2002) and confirm low-level expectations (Dehaene et al., 2001).
Repeated stimuli produce robust priming effects (Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010), decreasing
task reaction times and errors (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994), saccade latencies (McPeek,
Maljkovic, & Nakayama, 1999), and the amount of neural activity required for processing (GrillSpector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; see also Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012).
Moreover, although both repeated and coherent stimuli facilitate relatively temporal
information processing, repeated ones have been shown to do so more effectively than coherent
ones. Cai, Eagleman, and Ma (2015) showed that repeated sequences have stronger subjective
duration-distorting effects than coherent ones, suggesting that repeated stimuli are perceived
more efficiently, capture fewer attentional resources, and facilitate temporal information
processing more effectively than coherent stimuli. Repeated stimuli have also been shown to
facilitate priming effects to a greater degree than similar, yet not identical, stimuli (Koutstaal et
al., 2001).
In contrast to repeated chord sequences, coherent ones recruit a great number and variety
of musical expectations. Most of the music we hear in daily life is structurally coherent. It is rare
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that we hear a song on the radio repeat the first musical event innumerably. Although repetition
is a core musical element (Margulis, 2014), the kind of repetition that characterizes music is not
generally the ceaseless repetition of a single event. Nonetheless, in the present research, we will
refer to single repeating elements (e.g., I—I—I—I—I—I) as repeated chord sequences, and
collections of different, yet organized, elements as coherent chord sequences (e.g., iii—vi—ii—
IV—V—viio —I).
Different, yet organized, musical elements—those ordered in structurally coherent
ways—are frequently encountered in everyday life. People of western society most often hear
structurally coherent music, and thus form strong schemas that music, in general, should sound
coherent. These schemas, or schematic expectations, govern our perceptions of music. The
ability that music has to form, confirm, violate, and delay expectations is a big part of what
makes music emotionally moving and engaging. How does music manage to pull us to the edge
of our seats at a concert hall, or make us jump up and down at a festival? Music does this by
diligently manipulating, teasing, twisting, and turning our sense of knowing what we are going to
hear, and when we are going to hear it.
Manipulations of musical expectations, furthermore, facilitate both temporal and
nontemporal information processing. We expect musical chord sequences to both contain typical
chords, such as dominants and tonics. This is an expectation about nontemporal information. We
also expect the tonic to follow the dominant—an expectation about temporal information.
Coherent chord sequences confirm both of these types of expectations—expectations about both
temporal and nontemporal information. Coherent chord sequences include both the “usual
suspects” and their “usual orderings.” Thus, coherent chord sequences, having both predictable
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temporal and nontemporal elements, facilitate both temporal and nontemporal information
processing.
In sum, repeated chord sequences facilitate temporal information processing, and
coherent chord sequences facilitate both temporal and nontemporal information processing. The
distinction between the type of temporal information processing facilitated by repeated and
coherent chord sequences is that coherent ones facilitate temporal information processing by
focusing attention on temporal musical properties (e.g., rhythm), whereas repeated chord
sequences facilitate temporal information processing by allowing attention to effectively track
the passage of time (e.g., count seconds). It is easier to count seconds when presented with
repeated events than when presented with non-repeated events because repeated events capture
relatively few attentional resources and consume relatively little cognitive capacity (Boltz, 1995;
Jones & Boltz 1989; Zakay, 1993; Zakay & Block, 1995).
Music and Time
Music is particularly well suited for the study of psychological time. There are many
reasons for this, 10 of which are outlined here: (1) music is temporal, (2) music is an auditory
stimulus, (3) music comprises pitches, (4) music comprises chords, (5) music is highly
structured, (6) music lacks a semantics, (7) music manipulates expectations, (8) music affects
emotions, (9) music distorts subjective time, and (10) music is pervasive in the literature.
Music is temporal. Time is intrinsic to music. Music consists of events that change over
time. Pitches go up and down. Harmonies modulate. Rhythms are temporal patterns established
by the rate of these changes. In contrast to static art forms, such as paintings and sculptures,
music changes over time—music is dynamic. Temporal relationships between chord sequences
play a key role in the processing of musical harmony (Bigand, Madurell, Tillmann, & Pineau,
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1999). The different ways in which music unfolds over time uniquely affect subjective
experiences of time.
Music is an auditory stimulus. The auditory modality has extremely high temporal
resolution (Block, 1990). People have better temporal sensitivity in the auditory than in the
visual modality (Shams & Kim, 2010; Ortega, Guzman-Martinez, Grabowecky, & Suzuki,
2014), and are better at discriminating temporal intervals with the help of auditory cues than
visual cues (Grondin & McAuley, 2009). Auditory information, moreover, has been shown to
affect visual duration judgments, but not vice versa (Klink, Montijn, & van Wezel, 2011).
Human perceptions of temporal phenomena are most often studied in the auditory domain
(Penhune, Zatorre, & Evans, 1998).
Music comprises pitches. Pitch stimuli have better temporal sensitivity than speech
stimuli (Grondin, Bisson, & Gagnon, 2011). Pitches have their own memory store (Deutsch,
1972), making memory for pitches resilient to speech masking (Deutsch, 1970). Pitch stimuli
afford more experimental control than speech stimuli—speech is one of most complex auditory
signals in the environment (Donnadieu, 2007).
Pitch stimuli are often preferred to speech stimuli when conducting time estimation
research (Field & Groeger, 2004; Ponsot, Susini, & Meunier, 2015; Sasaki et al., 2010).
Sequences of pitches (melodies) are informative (see Boltz, 1989, 1991, 1992a, 1993, 1998;
Boltz & Jones, 1986), and sequences of overlapping pitches (chord sequences) are especially
informative (see Bigand & Parncutt, 1999; Bigand et al., 1999; Bigand, Poulin, Tillmann,
Madurell, & D'Adamo, 2003; Bueno & Ramos, 2007; Droit-Volet, Bigand, Ramos, & Bueno,
2010; Firmino & Bueno, 2008, 2013, 2014; Firmino, Bueno, & Bigand, 2009; Lebrun-Guillaud
& Tillmann, 2007; Lebrun-Guillaud, Tillmann, & Justus, 2008; Regnault, Bigand, & Besson,
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2001; Schmuckler & Boltz, 1994; Tillmann & Bigand, 2001; Tillmann, Bigand, & Pineau, 1998;
Tillmann & Lebrun-Guillaud, 2006).
Music comprises chords. When the empirical goal is to produce strong manipulations of
expectation, chord sequences are often superior to pitch sequences. Chord sequences manipulate
expectations about a greater number of musical events than pitches, expectations about
harmonic—in addition to melodic—relationships between musical events, and expectations
about the manner in which those harmonic musical events change within sequences. Whereas
pitches manipulate expectations about individual tones, chord sequences manipulate expectations
about groups of overlapping tones. Whereas pitches manipulate melodic expectations, chords
manipulate both melodic and harmonic expectations. Whereas melodies confirm, violate, and
delay predictions about the behavior of melodic intervals, chord sequences confirm, violate, and
delay predictions about the behavior of both melodic and harmonic intervals, which triggers
musical expectations that are involuntary and firmly engrained in the human cognitive system
from extended exposure to western tonal music. Moreover, in contrast to melodies, chord
sequences manipulate expectations about voice leading, or the ways in which individual pitches
within each chord move between subsequent chords.
Music is highly structured. Event structure is a key factor in time estimation research,
and music has rich varieties of well-understood event structures. Very specific rules dictate the
relationships between musical elements (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983). The high degree of
structure in music makes it easy to manipulate structural coherence and shift temporal
orientation.
Music lacks a semantics. Musical syntactic processing involves the same brain areas as
linguistic syntactic processing (Patel, 2003, 2007). Both language and music activate robust and
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well-researched sets of expectations. Just as linguistic syntactical and grammatical rules are
reinforced by linguistic expectancies, musical well-formedness rules are reinforced by musical
expectancies. Just as people have strong expectations for how speech unfolds, people have strong
expectancies for how music unfolds. Indeed, violations of musical well-formedness rules activate
similar neural networks as violations of linguistic syntactical and grammatical rules (Maess,
Koelsch, Gunter, & Friederici, 2001).
That said, music and language are distinct in how they transmit meaning. Meaning in
language depends on semantic comprehension; meaning in music, on the other hand, revolves
around the manipulation of expectation. Language has semantic meaning; music has aesthetic
meaning. In this way, music affords the opportunity to enhance experimental control. Since
music lacks a clear semantics, it eliminates a potential complicating factor in stimuli design.
Music manipulates expectations. Expectation is an undeniably important factor in time
estimation research. Gaudreault and Fortin (2013), Thomaschke, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2011),
and Boltz (1998) have all shown that expectancy manipulations affect people's subjective
experiences of time. Few mediums manipulate expectations more naturally and to a greater
extent than music.
Music affects emotions. Music impacts emotions (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008; Meyer,
1956) and emotions impact psychological time (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). The manipulation of
musical expectancies is one of the most central ways that music shapes emotional experiences.
Musical surprise registers as tension, and as expectations develop and are thwarted and satisfied,
dynamic patterns of perceived tension and resolution emerge.
Music affects subjective time. Music is dynamic, and its progression shapes durational
experiences. Music can shorten subjective duration, making time seem to have passed relatively
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quickly—we often lose track of time while listening. Listening to our favorite tunes might make
time seem to “fly by” by turning our focus away from the passage of time. Music can also
lengthen subjective duration, making time seem to have passed relatively slowly. We sometimes
find ourselves focusing on nothing but time when hearing undesirable music. Unwanted party
music might make failed attempts to sleep seem to last forever.
Music is pervasive in the literature. Researchers often use music to study psychological
time (see Bailey & Areni, 2006; Barnes & Jones, 2000; Bigand et al., 1999; Bisson, Tobin, &
Grondin, 2009; Boltz, 1989, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998; Bueno, Firmino, &
Engelmann, 2002; Chebat, Gelinas-Chebat, & Filiatrault, 1993; Jones, 1990; Jones, Boltz, &
Kidd, 1982; Kellaris & Kent, 1992; Phillips & Cross, 2011; Ziv & Omer, 2010). Some models of
time estimation, in fact, revolve almost entirely around music (see Jones & Boltz, 1989; Schafer,
Fachner, & Smukalla, 2013; see also Caetano, Mouchtaris, & Wiering, 2012). This existing body
of research makes it easy to frame new studies about music and psychological time.
Time Estimation Method
Verbal estimation. One of the most common methods to measure subjective duration is
verbal estimation (Bisson, Tobin, & Grondin, 2009). Verbal estimates are explicit reports of
subjective duration made using numeric labels (e.g., seconds). It is particularly appropriate to use
the method of verbal estimation when measuring the subjective duration of relatively long
intervals. Verbal estimates are practical because they help keep experiments to reasonable
lengths—people can report numeric values relatively quickly. Using the method of verbal
estimation can be troublesome, however, because verbal estimates rely on language. People
making verbal estimations are burdened with the tricky task of translating subjective temporal
experiences into objective temporal labels.
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Duration reproduction. The method of duration reproduction does not rely on language.
Duration reproductions involve remembering, imagining, and replicating previously experienced
temporal intervals. Duration reproductions can be produced after participants experience a
temporal interval by either (a) experimentally marking the beginning of a reproduction interval
and instructing people to press a button after an identical amount of time as the experienced
interval has passed, (b) instructing people to press a button to both start and stop a timer to
demarcate a duration identical to the experienced interval, or (c) instructing people to hold down
a button for a duration identical to the experienced interval. Most common is the version that
requires people to both start and stop a timer, probably because it yields the most accurate
estimates (Mioni, Stablum, McClintock, & Grondin, 2014).
The method of duration reproduction is arguably the most reliable and sensitive measure
of subjective duration (Fraisse, 1963; McKay, 1977). The method of duration reproduction is
best suited for relatively short intervals—people tend to underestimate duration as the actual
durations of intervals lengthen.1 That said, it is ideal to use more than one method of measuring
subjective duration when conducting time estimation research (Brown, 1985). Researchers tend
to use both verbal estimation and duration reproduction in the same experiment (Block, George,
& Reed, 1980; Brown, 1985; Warm, Smith, & Caldwell, 1967).
Musical imagery reproduction. Explicit short interval time estimation experiments use
methods of measuring subjective duration such as verbal estimation and duration reproduction
(Grondin, 2010). The instructions in these types of experiments, however, include the word
“duration” or “time.”2 No short interval time estimation experiments have included instructions
that do not state duration.3
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In contrast to typical explicit short interval time estimation experiments, we used a novel
type of reproduction to measure subjective duration that avoids stating duration or time in the
experimental instructions. We instructed people to generate musical imagery, recorded the
amount of time it took people to do so, and treated those emergent temporal intervals as
measures of subjective duration.4 We term these emergent temporal intervals musical imagery
reproductions. There is evidence to suggest that musical imagery reproductions can be treated as,
and are sensible and accurate representations of, subjective duration.
Halpern and Zatorre (1999), investigating the neurological correlates of musical imagery
using melodies, instructed people to listen to musical clips, imagine them, and then press a
button when the clips reached their original ending points. To confirm that the auditory images
were conforming to the actual durations of the musical clips, they compared the differences
between the latencies of the short, medium, and long trials. The amount of time that passed from
the offsets of the musical clips to the final button presses matched the actual durations of the
clips. These findings show that musical imaginings can yield relatively accurate measures of
subjective duration, without requiring participants to undertake an explicitly temporal task—
without stating duration or time in the experimental instructions.
Grondin and Killeen (2009), furthermore, instructed people to make duration
reproductions while either singing familiar songs, counting seconds, or refraining from engaging
in time-keeping behaviors. Duration reproductions created while singing were as accurate as
those created while counting. These findings suggest that timing mechanisms involved in singing
are similar to those involved in duration estimation. Moreover, Weber and Brown (1986) showed
that it takes the same amount of time to imagine musical clips as it does to sing them. And
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people tend to imagine songs at their original tempos (Levitin & Cook, 1996; see also Halpern,
1988b).
Musical imagery reproductions are similar to duration reproductions. Both require
starting and stopping timers while mentally rehearsing information stored in memory, and both
likely involve similar temporal representations (see Halpern, 1988a); even visual imagery has
emergent temporal properties (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978).5 The distinction between musical
imagery reproductions and duration reproductions is that the instructions of duration
reproductions explicitly state duration, whereas those of musical imagery reproductions do not.
Duration reproductions involve retrieving from memory and rehearsing temporal
information. Musical imagery reproductions, on the other hand, involve retrieving from memory
and rehearsing musical information (Halpern & Zatorre, 1999). Musical information comprises
both temporal and nontemporal properties.6 Hence, people imagine and rehearse more
nontemporal information—and engage in more nontemporal information processing—when
making musical imagery reproductions than when making duration reproductions. Musical
imagery reproductions facilitate nontemporal information processing.
People also engage in more nontemporal information processing when making musical
imagery reproductions than when making verbal estimations. Verbal estimations only involve
retrieving from memory and reporting temporal information—only involve attending to the
passage of time and stating a numeric label. Verbal estimations facilitate temporal information
processing.
Time Estimation Paradigm
Subjective duration can be measured in one of two paradigms: prospective or
retrospective. In prospective paradigms, participants know that duration judgments will be asked
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of them prior to the start of trials; in retrospective paradigms, participants do not. In retrospective
paradigms, participants are asked to make duration judgments only after the experimental trial
has ended. Prospective duration judgments illuminate how factors affect psychological time
when people focus on the passage of time during the to-be-judged interval. Retrospective
duration judgments, on the other hand, illuminate how factors affect psychological time when
people focus on things unrelated to the passage of time during the to-be-judged interval.
Some researchers have considered prospective judgments to be measures of experienced
duration, and retrospective ones to be measures of remembered duration (Block, 1974, 1990;
Zakay & Block, 2004). Yet because both types of duration judgments are collected following the
experienced interval, and thus rely on memory (Rattat & Droit-Volet, 2010), it seems appropriate
to consider prospective judgments as those that rely on remembered temporal information, and
retrospective ones as those that rely on remembered nontemporal information.
Prospective judgments tend to be more accurate, less variable, and longer than
retrospective ones (cf. Grondin & Laflamme, 2015). Both prospective and retrospective
judgments are likely driven by distinct cognitive (Zakay & Block, 2004) and neurological
processes (Rao, Mayer, & Harrington, 2001), but might nevertheless involve similar timing
mechanisms (Block, 1992; Brown & Stubbs, 1988).
Researchers using the retrospective paradigm face methodological limitations:
Retrospective duration judgments are often unclear, unreliable, and inconsistent (Block et al.,
1980; Hicks, Miller, & Kinsbourne, 1976; Zakay, 1989). Retrospective duration judgments are
hard to interpret, and represent time estimation processes that are hard to manipulate.
Furthermore, a retrospective experiment reveals its true purpose to participants only after its
completion.
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Researchers have devised elaborate measures to prevent people from suspecting the
importance of the passage of time in retrospective experiments. Zakay (1993), for instance,
refrained from asking people to remove their watches because this question might have shifted
attention to the passage of time. Instead, Zakay required that people use their non-dominant
hands to complete the experimental tactual tracing tasks, keeping the hand most likely to bear a
watch under the table, and preventing them from glancing at it during the experiment.
Only the first experimental trial can be retrospective—all trials thereafter are
contaminated by the awareness of upcoming duration judgments. Some researchers have found
ways around this limitation. For instance, Jones and Boltz (1989) had participants memorize all
of the melody stimuli in the first experimental block, and then estimate the durations of all of the
melodies in the second experimental block.
Although there are ways to work around the limitations associated with the retrospective
paradigm, there are more practical and less problematic ways for researchers who aim to
facilitate nontemporal information processing to do so than using the retrospective paradigm.
Researchers might find it useful to use musical imagery reproductions, for instance. Musical
imagery reproductions both facilitate nontemporal information processing and, among other
things, allow participants to complete multiple trials while staying ignorant to the true purpose of
the experiment.
Time Estimation Models
Dynamic attending theory. Jones and Boltz (1989) emphasize that event structure plays
an important role in psychological time. The extent to which temporal and nontemporal
information are structurally compatible influences the degree to which people attend to relatively
low-level stimulus characteristics (analytic attending) or high- level ones (future-oriented
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attending). Moreover, incompatible (incoherent) event structures can disorient listeners, consume
attentional resources, disrupt memory, and distort duration estimates. Confirmed, violated, and
delayed expectations can make incoherent event structures that seem to end too early seem
relatively short, and ones that seem to end too late seem relatively long. The importance of
factors such as event structure, dynamic attending, and expectations in time estimation research
cannot be overstated (Phillips, 2015).
Attention-based models. Attention-based models of short interval time estimation argue
that the riddle of subjective duration can be solved simply by considering whether people focus
on time, or not. The more we focus on time, the longer time should seem to last; the less we
focus on time, the shorter time should seem to last.
Attention-based models emphasize that people have both a temporal processor and a
nontemporal processor. These processors compete for limited attentional resources (Kahneman,
1973). The more attentional resources allocated to the temporal processor, the longer duration
estimates should become; the more attentional resources allocated to the nontemporal processor,
the shorter duration estimates should become (Thomas & Brown, 1974; Thomas & Weaver,
1975).
The attentional gate model, for instance, theorizes that subjective temporal units, or
pulses created by a pacemaker, pass through a cognitive “gate” and accumulate in a cognitive
“counter” (Zakay & Block, 1995). The more attentional resources that are allocated to time
during an interval, the wider the gate opens, the more pulses are counted, and the longer
subjective duration estimates should become.
Memory-based models. Memory-based models posit that subjective duration is a
function of the amount of meaningful information stored in and retrieved from memory. The
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storage size hypothesis, for example, theorizes that the greater the amount of information stored
in memory, the longer duration estimates should become (Ornstein, 1969). Similarly, the
contextual change (Block, 1978, 1982, 1989, 1990; Block & Reed, 1978) and change
segmentation (Poynter, 1983, 1989; Poynter & Homa, 1983) hypotheses state that the greater the
amount of contextual changes and high priority, or attention-capturing, events perceived and
stored in memory, the longer duration estimates should become. The more meaningful chunks of
information we remember in retrospect (Friedman, 1993), the longer things should seem to have
lasted.
Competing models. Attention- and memory-based models make different predictions
about how various factors will affect subjective duration. One factor that these models make
opposite predictions about is nontemporal information processing load, or nontemporal task
difficulty. Nontemporal task difficulty, mental workload, or nontemporal information processing
load refers to the amount of effort, cognitive resources, cognitive capacity, or information
processing load required to complete a nontemporal task (Brown & Boltz, 2002; Proctor, Lu,
Van Zandt, & Weeks, 1994). For example, the nontemporal task difficulty of the Color-Word
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is greater than that of the Word Stroop task (Logan, 1980; Logan &
Zbrodoff, 1979). The simultaneous presentation of colors and words in the Color-Word Stroop
task consumes relatively many attentional resources, thereby eliciting greater reaction times and
numbers of errors (Dyer, 1973).
Attention-based models predict that greater nontemporal task difficulty will shorten
subjective duration. This is because greater nontemporal task difficulty should serve to distract
attention from the passage of time, decreasing the number of accumulated subjective temporal
units counted at the time of judgment, and thus shortening duration estimates. Memory-based
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models, in contrast, predict that greater nontemporal task difficulty will lengthen subjective
duration because greater nontemporal task difficulty should serve to increase the amount of high
priority events perceived during the interval and remembered at the time of judgment, thus
lengthening duration estimates.
A unified model. The resource allocation model (RAM) asserts that the ways in which
nontemporal task difficulty affects subjective duration are contingent upon the degree to which
people are engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing. Nontemporal
task difficulty should shorten subjective duration when people are engaged in relatively temporal
information processing, but lengthen subjective duration when people are engaged in relatively
nontemporal information processing.
According to the RAM, there exists a temporal processor, or an attentional timer
(Berlyne, 1966), that stores and counts subjective temporal units (e.g., seconds), and a
nontemporal processor, or a memory-based mechanism, that stores and counts high-priority
events and contextual changes (e.g., textures). Both processors encode the contents of intervals.
People can attend to the contents of intervals while engaging both processors. The amount of
attentional resources allocated to each processor varies. The degree to which people engage a
particular processor determines that processor’s contribution to the duration estimates. The more
that people attend to and remember information encoded in a processor, the more that processor
will contribute to duration estimates.
Relatively high amounts of attentional resources are allocated to, and traces of
information are retrievable from, the temporal processor when, for example, people judge
duration prospectively, or when people are presented with homogeneous, or repeated, stimuli
(Zakay, 1993). In contrast, relatively high amounts of attention are allocated to, and traces of
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information are retrievable from, the nontemporal processor when people judge duration
retrospectively, or when people are presented with unpredictable, or incoherent, stimuli (Jones &
Boltz, 1989; Zakay & Block, 1995).
The RAM was motivated by the observation that although attention- and memory-based
models make contradictory predictions, both models are valid in certain contexts. Findings
explained by attention-based models tend to emerge in conditions where people are aware of
upcoming duration judgments, estimate duration immediately after intervals end, and base
duration estimates on temporal information stored in short-term memory. These conditions
facilitate temporal information processing. On the other hand, findings explained by memorybased models tend to emerge in conditions where people are ignorant to upcoming duration
judgments, estimate durations after delays when intervals end, and base duration estimates on
nontemporal information stored in long-term memory.7 These conditions facilitate nontemporal
information processing.
Neither attention- nor memory-based models can solely account for all of the
contradictory results found in time estimation studies testing the effects of time estimation
paradigm, but together they can: Attention-based models tend to explain duration estimates in
prospective paradigms; memory-based models tend to explain duration estimates in retrospective
paradigms (Block & Zakay, 1997). Similar conclusions can be drawn in studies testing the
effects of time estimation delay and time estimation reference (Zakay, 1989, 1993; Zakay &
Fallach, 1984).8
Evidence for the RAM. Miller, G. W., Hicks, and Willette (1978) showed that greater
nontemporal task difficulty (fewer rehearsed trials) shortened subjective duration when people
were engaged in relatively temporal information processing (rehearsal; prospective), but
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lengthened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information
processing (rehearsal; retrospective).
Block et al. (1980) varied whether or not a liquid beaker boiled and instructed
participants to “observe the beaker.” Intervals that contained boiling liquid were judged as
shorter than those that did not when people were engaged in relatively temporal information
processing (reproductions; prospective), but as longer than those that did not when people were
engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (reproductions; retrospective).
McClain (1983) manipulated nontemporal task difficulty by varying the length of word
lists. She required that participants classify words based on either shallow, graphemic properties
or deep, semantic ones. Greater nontemporal task difficulty (longer lists) shortened subjective
duration when people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing (prospective;
semantic- intentional; semantic- incidental), but lengthened subjective duration when people were
engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (retrospective).
Zakay and Fallach (1984) showed that greater nontemporal task difficulty (highdifficulty Stroop task) shortened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively
temporal information processing (immediate estimation), but not when people were engaged in
relatively nontemporal information processing (remote estimation).
Zakay (1989) similarly showed that greater nontemporal task difficulty (CW Stroop task)
shortened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively temporal information
processing (prospective-immediate estimation), but not when people were engaged in relatively
nontemporal information processing (prospective-remote estimation).
Zakay (1993), in addition, showed how factors that manipulate information processing
can interact. Zakay found that greater nontemporal task difficulty (complex tactile shapes)
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shortened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively temporal information
processing (absolute; prospective), but lengthened subjective duration when people were
engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (relative; retrospective).
Zakay, Tsal, Moses, and Shahar (1994) varied the degree to which stimulus properties
promoted interval segmentation—participants perceived auditory word and tactual letter lists as
having greater or fewer numbers of “chunks.” Greater segmentation lengthened subjective
duration when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing
(retrospective-absolute; retrospective-comparative), but did not affect subjective duration when
people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing (prospective-absolute;
prospective-comparative).9
Zakay and Block (2004) manipulated nontemporal task difficulty in a variety of ways,
showing how varying levels of syntactic ambiguity, Stroop task difficulty, and task switching
can compound to increase difficulty.10 Greater nontemporal task difficulty shortened subjective
duration when people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing (prospective),
but lengthened subjective duration when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal
information processing (retrospective).
As a whole, these studies lend a good deal of evidence in support of the RAM. The RAM
unifies the predictions of both the attention- and memory-based models of time estimation,
maximizing its predictive power, accuracy, and specificity. The RAM provides a useful
framework from which to make predictions about the effects of attention-capturing stimuli on
psychological time.
Temporal expansion hypothesis. In 2004, Tse, Intriligator, Rivest, and Cavanagh ran a
series of experiments showing how oddballs are judged as longer than standards.11 The finding
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that oddballs are judged as longer than standards is robust and reliable in the time perception
literature, and is known as the temporal oddball effect, or the temporal oddball illusion
(Birngruber, Schröter, & Ulrich, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a; Kim & McAuley, 2013; Pariyadath &
Eagleman, 2007, 2012; Schindel, Rowlands, & Arnold, 2011; see also Birngruber, Schröter, &
Ulrich, 2015b; Matthews, 2015; Matthews & Gheorghiu, 2016).
Tse et al. (2004) proposed the temporal expansion hypothesis to explain why oddballs are
judged as longer than standards: Oddballs expand, or lengthen, subjective duration because
oddballs capture attention, increase the rate of information processing, and increase the number
of subjective temporal units stored and counted in a cognitive timer. Tse et al. based this
hypothesis on the tenets of attention-based models of short interval time estimation, such that
attention-based models assert the existence of a counter mechanism that accumulates and tallies
the number of subjective temporal units registered in a cognitive timer (Thomas & Weaver,
1975; Treisman, 1963). Attention-capturing stimuli should shorten subjective duration because
when stimuli capture attention, more attentional resources are directed to the nontemporal
information of the stimuli, and fewer attentional resources are directed to time-keeping
behaviors.
Rationale for the Present Research
Past research shows that oddballs are judged as longer than standards, but no research has
tested whether or not this temporal oddball illusion applies to intervals, in addition to individual
events. Are intervals that contain oddballs judged as longer than those that do not? The temporal
expansion hypothesis predicts that people will judge intervals that contain oddballs as longer
than those that do not. The RAM, on the other hand, predicts that people will judge intervals that
contain oddballs as shorter than those that do not when people are engaged in relatively temporal
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information processing, but as longer than those that do not when people are engaged in
relatively nontemporal information processing.
The temporal expansion hypothesis asserts that oddballs lengthen subjective duration
because more subjective temporal units are stored and counted in the cognitive timer when
perceiving oddballs than when perceiving standards. If this is true, then more subjective temporal
units should be stored and counted in the cognitive timer when perceiving intervals that contain
oddballs than when perceiving otherwise identical intervals that do not contain oddballs.
Therefore, if the temporal expansion hypothesis is valid in the context of intervals, in addition to
individual events, in addition to the context of individual event time perception, then we should
find that intervals that contain oddballs are consistently judged as longer than those that do not.
The RAM, in contrast, posits that the inclusion of oddballs in intervals should both
distract attention from the passage of time when people are engaging in relatively temporal
information processing and increase the number of high-priority events perceived and
remembered when people are engaging in relatively nontemporal information processing.
Therefore, if the RAM is valid, then we should find that intervals that contain oddballs are
judged as shorter than those that do not when people are engaged in relatively temporal
information processing, but as longer than those that do not when people are engaged in
relatively nontemporal information processing.
The present research tests these competing hypotheses. In two experiments, we
manipulated whether or not musical chord sequences contained oddballs, and the degree to
which people were engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing.
Experiment 1
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In experiment 1, we manipulated the degree to which people were engaged in relatively
temporal or nontemporal information processing by (a) instructing participants to make either
verbal estimations or musical imagery reproductions (response type), and (b) varying whether
chord sequences were repeated, coherent, or incoherent (event structure).
We were inspired to vary response type by other studies showing that varying the types
of judgments people make is an effective way to manipulate the degree to which people engage
in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing (Zakay, 1993; Zakay et al., 1994).
Much of the previous research, however, has used the retrospective paradigm to facilitate
nontemporal information processing. We used the novel and covert method of musical imagery
reproduction to facilitate nontemporal information processing. Musical imagery reproductions
allowed us to facilitate nontemporal information processing while avoiding some of the
methodological issues associated with the retrospective paradigm.
We chose to vary musical event structure because it is particularly well suited to
manipulate the extent to which people engage in relatively temporal or nontemporal information
processing (Boltz, 1992b, 1995, 1998, 1999; Brown & Boltz, 2002; Jones, 1990; Zakay, 1993),
but is seldom used to do so. We used chord, rather than pitch, sequences to manipulate a greater
number and variety of expectations (e.g., harmony and voice leading). Repeated chord sequences
are highly predictable, consume relatively few attentional resources, and facilitate temporal
information processing—people presented with repeated events are able to allocate most of their
attentional resources to time-keeping. In contrast, incoherent chord sequences are unpredictable,
consume relatively many attentional resources, and facilitate nontemporal information
processing—expectancy violations consume attentional resources that would have otherwise
been available to track time. Coherent chord sequences are relatively predictable, confirm
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schematic and veridical musical expectancies, draw attention to both temporal and nontemporal
musical properties, and facilitate both temporal and nontemporal information processing.
Method
Participants. A total of 56 undergraduate students enrolled in General Psychology at the
University of Arkansas volunteered to participate in this experiment in exchange for course
credit. We excluded from the analysis the data of 4 participants (2 reported abnormal hearing, 1
experienced technical issues, and 1 disregarded instructions). The remaining 52 participants (31
females) ranged from 18 to 39 years of age (M = 19.88; SD = 3.45). None were music majors,
but 9 had received formal musical training for at least 1 year, ranging from 1 to 8 years (M =
3.60; SD = 2.61). All of the participants gave informed consent before participating in this
experiment. This experiment was approved by the University of Arkansas IRB.
Stimuli. We composed novel chord sequences using Finale 2012 music notation
software. We created original chord sequences to control for extraneous variables and prior
familiarity, isolating the musical variables of interest and ruling out the possibility that
participants have previously heard the music. The chord sequences were composed of 4-voice
(SATB) piano chords (no rests or silences)—half contained oddballs, half did not. The oddball
was a sliding tone (E2 to F#6; 82 Hz to 1480 Hz; following Tse et al., 2004) played with an
Ocarina timbre.12 We normalized the amplitude of the chord sequences using Audacity (2.0.6).
The first chord of all of the chord sequences was root position C Major. This chord
played consecutively in the repeated chord sequences (see Figure 1). The coherent and
incoherent chord sequences included chords taken from the scale of C Major (I, ii, iii, IV, V, vi,
viio ; i.e., C Major, D Minor, E Minor, F Major, G Major, A Minor, B Diminished). The
distinction between the coherent and incoherent chord sequences was the order of the chords, not
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the chords themselves. We ordered the chords in the coherent chord sequences in ways that
conformed to the rules of standard tonal harmony, such as voice leading, harmonic change, and
melodic resolution (see Figure 2). In contrast, we ordered the chords in the incoherent chord
sequences in ways that violated those rules (see Figure 3).
The incoherent chord sequences were merely scrambled versions of the coherent ones.
Kowal (1987) made coherent musical tone sequences incoherent by reversing the order of the
tones. Kowal violated veridical, in addition to schematic, musical expectancies—the tone
sequences were taken from familiar traditional folk tunes. We aimed to control for prior
exposure and familiarity in experiment 1. We scrambled the coherent chord sequences (e.g., iii—
vi—ii—IV—V—viio —I) to create corresponding incoherent versions (vi—V—ii—I—viio —
IV—iii) similar to how Pariyadath and Eagleman (2007) scrambled predictable number
sequences (1—2—3—4—5) to create corresponding unpredictable versions (e.g., 1—4—3—5—
2).
In the chord sequences that contained oddballs, an oddball occurred once after every two
to six chords, and one of those oddballs always occurred on the final beat of the chord sequence.
The chord sequences that contained oddballs were in all other regards identical to those that did
not (see Figure 4).
We varied whether the chord sequences were repeated, coherent, or incoherent (three
levels), and whether or not they contained oddballs (two levels) independently. This created six
possible oddball X event structure pairings. To broaden generalizability, we created 12 “base”
chord progressions (each of which had six oddball X event structure pairing versions). This
produced 72 unique chord sequences. We then created 12 variations (crossed in a betweensubjects Latin-square design) of each of the 72 unique chord sequences. These 12 variations
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differed in oddball placement set, or the particular sequential positions where the oddballs
occurred—we placed oddballs on different musical beats. All other factors were held constant.
To create the 12 “base” chord progressions, we varied the actual duration, the tempo, and
rhythm of the chord sequences independently. We used three different durations, two different
tempi, and two different rhythms—this produced 12 duration X tempo X rhythm pairings. The
three durations were 3.5 s, 7 s, and 12 s. The two tempi were 71 beats per minute (bpm; 850 ms
IOI) and 86 bpm (700 ms IOI). For the two rhythms, where eighth notes occurred in rhythm I,
triplets occurred in rhythm II, and vice versa; both rhythms were composed of quarter notes (one
chord per beat), eighth notes (two chords per beat), and triplets (three chords per beat). The 12
base chord progressions were identical in all other regards. We varied tempo and rhythm to
discourage identical trial responses, and encourage thoughtful and active participation. We
varied duration to help account for methodological inconsistencies in the literature. It is
important to use a variety of durations in every time estimation experiment because researchers
often find different results when studying stimuli of different durations (Brown, 1985).
Moreover, we included durations both shorter and longer than 5 seconds to expand
generalizability to durations that rely on relatively short- and long-term memory, and to
durations within the perceptual present, or specious present (see Block, 1990; Clark, 1999;
Fraisse, 1984; James, 1890).
Each participant heard each of the 72 unique chord sequences twice, amounting to 622
chords and 74 oddballs, over the course of the experiment. The overall probability, then, of an
oddball occurring was 11 %, comparable to other influential investigations of the effects of
oddballs on subjective duration (see Tse et al., 2004).
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Procedure. The experiment took place in a quiet room in the Music Cognition Lab at the
University of Arkansas. Participants were tested individually in a 4’ x 4’ WhisperRoom sound
isolation enclosure (MDL 4848E/ENV). They sat facing a 22” Dell P2212H monitor while
wearing Sennheisser HD 600 open-air, around-ear headphones, and made responses using the
computer keyboard, mouse, and DirectIN Rotary Controller (PCB v2014). The auditory stimuli
were presented binaurally at a comfortable listening level. The experiment was presented using
DirectRT (Version 2014; Empirisoft Corporation, New York, NY) on a Dell OptiPlex 7010
desktop computer running Windows 7. Participants signed the consent form and placed all of
their belongings and potentially distracting materials (e.g., phones and watches) in the
experimental waiting room before entering the booth. Participants progressed through the
experiment at their own pace.
The experiment consisted of two blocks. Each block consisted of three practice trials,
followed by 72 randomly presented experimental trials. Each participant completed 144
experimental trials over the course of the experiment. In each of the trials, participants pressed a
button to start a chord sequence and, after its completion, made a response. This response was a
musical imagery reproduction in the first block, and a verbal estimation in the second block.
In the first block, immediately upon the closure of the chord sequence in each trial,
participants were presented with the on-screen question: “What is the duration of this excerpt? In
other words, how many seconds passed from the moment it started to the moment it finished?”
Participants were encouraged to round to the 10th decimal place and be as specific and accurate
as possible.
In the second block, immediately upon the closure of the chord sequence in each trial,
participants were presented with the on-screen instructions: “Imagine that excerpt playing back
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in your head. Re-play it through your head the exact way you heard it play through the
headphones—from start to finish. Actually imagine it sound in your head exactly as you heard it
sound through the headphones. Press the green button to mark the start of the excerpt you're
imagining. Press the red button to mark the finish of the excerpt you're imagining.”
A brief demographic questionnaire concluded the experiment, which lasted about 50 min.
Data Analysis. We analyzed these data using linear mixed modeling (LMM; see Baayen,
2008; Quené & Van den Bergh, 2004; Finch, Bolin, & Kelley, 2014). The four within-subjects
fixed-effects factors were oddball (yes or no), response type (verbal estimation or musical
imagery reproduction), event structure (repeated, coherent, or incoherent), and actual duration
(3.5 s, 7 s, or 12 s). The between-subjects fixed-effect was oddball placement variation (12
levels). The covariate was formal musical training (had or had not received training for at least 1
year; following Janata & Paroo, 2006). The random effects were subject (52 levels) and item
(base chord progression; 12 levels). We obtained a standardized measure of subjective duration
by dividing the raw verbal estimation and musical imagery reproduction responses (ms) by the
actual durations of the chord sequences. Ratio scores represent directional bias; values above 1
represent overestimations and values below 1 represent underestimations (see Hornstein &
Rotter, 1969). The data consisted of 7488 normally distributed ratio scores, 31 of which were
identified as outliers using the generalized extreme studentized deviate method, and excluded
from the analysis (Rosner, 1983).
We first ran the maximal model that included all of the factors and their interactions, and
the random slopes of each of the factors within each of the subject and item crossed grouping
variables. We included maximal random slopes of the fixed effects to account for random slope
variance, and omitted the random slopes of the fixed effects in order of least random variance to
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obtain model convergence (following Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). The
final converged model included the random slopes of oddball and response type with the subject
grouping variable, and the random slopes of event structure and response type with the item
grouping variable.
Pseudo-R2 was .353, indicating that the final model explained, or modeled, 35.3 % more
variance than the base model (the base model included only the subject and item grouping
variables; Snijders & Bosker, 1994). The intercorrelation coefficients for subjects and items were
.295 and .06, respectively, displaying substantial clustering among subjects and mild clustering
among items.
We ran the analysis in R (R Core Team, 2015) with restricted maximum likelihood using
the lmer function of the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). We obtained
regression weights using the summary function of the lme4 package, F statistics and p values
(Satterthwaithe approximation) using the anova function of the car and lmerTest packages (Fox
& Weisberg, 2010), and normed means, standard deviations, and standard errors using the
summarySEwithin function of the Rmisc package (Morey, 2008).
Results and Discussion
The temporal expansion hypothesis predicts that people will judge the chord sequences
that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not, regardless of whether people are engaged
in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing.
In contrast, the RAM predicts that when people are engaged in relatively temporal
information processing, they will judge the chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter than
those that do not, but when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing,
they will judge the chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not.
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Specifically, the RAM predicts that in the present experiment (a) people will verbally
estimate the chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter, but reproduce with musical
imagery the chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer, than those that do not, and (b)
people will judge the repeated chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter, the incoherent
chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer, and the coherent chord sequences that contain
oddballs as neither shorter nor longer, than those that do not.
Furthermore, the RAM predicts that the effects of response type and event structure will
compound, such that (c) the finding that people verbally estimate the chord sequences that
contain oddballs as shorter than those that do not will be more robust when those chord
sequences are repeated than when they are coherent, which in turn will be more robust than when
they are incoherent, and (d) the finding that people reproduce with musical imagery the chord
sequences that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not will be more robust when those
chord sequences are incoherent than when they are coherent, which in turn will be more robust
than when they are repeated.
As predicted by the RAM, we found an oddball X response type interaction, F(1, 7251.36) =
37.41, p < .0001 (see Figure 5). People verbally estimated the chord sequences that contained
oddballs (M = 0.932; SD = 0.238) as shorter than those that did not (M = 0.957; SD = 0.242), β =
-.0245, t (161) = -3.99, SE = 0.0062, p = .0001, but reproduced with musical imagery the chord
sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.969; SD = 0.291) as longer than those that did not (M =
0.943; SD = 0.276), β = .0254, t (161) = 4.12, SE = 0.0062, p < .0001. These results show how
oddballs shorten the subjective duration of chord sequences when people are engaged in
relatively temporal information processing (verbal estimations), but lengthen the subjective
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duration of chord sequences when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information
processing (musical imagery reproductions).
Also in line with the RAM, we found an omnibus oddball X event structure interaction,
F(2, 7249.99) = 3.01, p = .049 (see Figure 6). This interaction was driven by the difference between
the effects of oddballs on the repeated chord sequences and those on the incoherent chord
sequences, β = -0.0103, t (7250) = -2.05, SE = .005, p = .040, and the difference between the effects
of oddballs on the repeated chord sequences and those on the coherent chord sequences, β = 0.0110, t (7250) = -2.20, SE = .005, p = .028. The effects of oddballs were more negatively related
to the repeated chord sequences than they were to the incoherent and coherent ones. People
appeared to judge the repeated chord sequences that contained oddballs as shorter than those that
did not (this difference was not significant at p = .064). These results further show how the
degree to which people are engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information
processing can shape the subjective duration-distorting effects of attention-capturing stimuli.
Although the oddball X response type X event structure interaction was not significant,
the influence of event structure on the effects of oddballs appeared to emerge only when people
were making musical imagery reproductions. The oddball X event structure interaction was
significant when people were making musical imagery reproductions, but not when they were
making verbal estimations. In the musical imagery reproduction condition, the effects of oddballs
were more positively related to the incoherent chord sequences than they were to the repeated
ones, β = .0381, t (7259) = 2.69, SE = .0142, p = .007, and more positively related to the coherent
chord sequences than they were to the repeated ones, although this difference was not significant
at p = .067 (see Figure 7). People reproduced with musical imagery both the incoherent chord
sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.961; SD = 0.225) as longer than those that did not (M =
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0.932; SD = 0.216), β = .0421, t (1113) = 4.12, SE = .0102, p < .0001, and the coherent chord
sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.955; SD = 0.215) as longer than those that did not (M =
0.941; SD = 0.210), β = .03, t (1107) = 2.93, SE = .0102, p = .003. These results offer some
additional evidence to support the RAM, and offer the possibility that the influence of event
structure on the effects of musical oddballs depend on musical imagery.
We also found a main effect of event structure, F(2, 29.88) = 4.22, p = .024, and an event
structure X response type interaction, F(1, 7250.08) = 9.80, p < .0001. People reproduced with
musical imagery the repeated chord sequences (M = 0.977; SD = 0.274) as longer than both the
coherent ones (M = 0.942; SD = 0.259), t (830) = 4.964, SE = .0071, p < .0001, and the incoherent
ones (M = 0.949; SD = 0.273), t (850) = 3.681, SE = .0074, p < .001; these differences did not
emerge when people were making verbal estimations. These results highlight the fact that the
coherent and incoherent chord, but not the repeated, sequences that contained oddballs were
reproduced with musical imagery as longer than those that did not.
Finally, we found a main effect of duration, F(2, 9) = 19.51, p < .001, and a duration X
response type interaction, F(2, 11.62) = 36.31, p < .0001. People verbally estimated the 3.5 s chord
sequences (M = 0.995; SD = 0.243) as longer than both the 7 s ones (M = 0.936; SD = 0.212), β =
.0605, t (9) = 3.138, SE = .0193, p = .012, and the 12 s ones (M = 0.903; SD = 0.216), β = .0927,
t (9) = 4.81, SE = .0193, p < .001. On the other hand, people reproduced with musical imagery the
12 s chord sequences (M = 0.849; SD = 0.231) as shorter than both the 3.5 s ones (M = 1.04; SD
= 0.283), β = -.1308, t (9) = -4.74, SE = .0276, p = .001, and the 7 s ones (M = 0.979; SD = 0.248),
β = -.1918, t (9) = -6.96, SE = .0276, p < .0001; people appeared to reproduced with musical
imagery the 7 s chord sequences as shorter than the 3.5 s ones (this difference was not significant
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at p = .054). These findings are in line with Vierordt’s law, and suggest that verbal estimations
are more resistant to underestimations than musical imagery reproductions.
No effects of oddball placement or formal musical training emerged. We found similar
patterns of results when analyzing these data with the outliers included.
Experiment 2
The findings of experiment 1 lend considerable evidence in support of the RAM. The
response type manipulation yeilded a robust interaction in the direction predicted by the RAM,
and similar patterns of effects emerged when manipulating event structure. Event structure,
however, appeared to influence the effects of oddballs in experiment 1 only when people were
making musical imagery reproductions, and not when they were making verbal estimations. To
further examine the influence of event structure on the subjective duration-distorting effects of
oddballs in experiment 2, we included only musical imagery reproductions.
In addition to varying event structure in experiment 2, we manipulated the degree to
which people were engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing by
varying event familiarity; we included half of the chord sequences in an experimental exposure
phase. Familiar events are veridically predictable, consume relatively few attentional resources,
and facilitate early stages of information processing (Avant, Lyman, & Antes, 1975; see also
Avant & Lyman, 1975). Stimuli that require relatively little cognitive capacity facilitate temporal
information processing (Zakay, 1993). This is because reductions in nontemporal information
processing load free attentional resources to process temporal information (Zakay & Block,
1995)—psychological time is extraordinarily sensitive to manipulations of attention (Brown,
2008). For the above reasons, Block, Hancock, and Zakay (2010) emphasized the importance
that familiarity might have on duration judgments. In line with the RAM, Block et al. expected
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that familiarity would have opposite subjective duration-distorting effects in prospective and
retrospective conditions—conditions that facilitate temporal and nontemporal information
processing, respectively (Zakay, 1989).
In experiment 2, we manipulated the degree to which people were engaged in relatively
temporal or nontemporal information processing by varying (a) whether chord sequences were
repeated, coherent, or incoherent (as in experiment 1), and (b) whether those chord sequences
were familiar or unfamiliar.
Method
Participants. A total of 57 undergraduate students enrolled in General Psychology at the
University of Arkansas volunteered to participate in this experiment in exchange for course
credit. We excluded from the analysis the data of 1 participant who reported abnormal hearing.
The remaining 56 (38 females) participants ranged from 18 to 23 years of age (M = 19.66; SD =
1.25). None were music majors, but 10 had received formal musical training for at least 1 year,
ranging from 1 to 11 years (M = 3.35; SD = 3.27). None had participated in experiment 1. All of
the participants gave informed consent before participating in this experiment. This experiment
was approved by the University of Arkansas IRB.
Stimuli. We reused the stimuli from experiment 1, with some modifications: We
shortened the actual durations of the 12 s and 7 s chord sequences to 8 s and 6 s, respectively—
and excluded the 3.5 s ones, altogether—to preserve the overall length of experiment 1. Whereas
experiment 1 included 72 unique chord sequences, experiment 2 included only 48. We held all
other factors identical to experiment 1.
Procedure. The first block of experiment 2 was an exposure phase. We randomly
presented to participants a series of 288 chord sequences (24 unique chord sequences played 12
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times each), and instructed participants to listen carefully to each one because important tasks
would follow.13
In the second block, participants reproduced with musical imagery each of the 48 unique
chord sequences (half of which were presented in the exposure phase and half of which were
not). Immediately upon the closure of the chord sequence in each of the 48 trials, participants
were presented with the on-screen instructions: “Imagine that same clip playing back in your
head. Re-play it the same way you heard it, from beginning to end. Left-click to begin your
imagined clip, then right-click when it ends.”
All other aspects of the procedure were identical to those of experiment 1.
Data Analysis. The four within-subjects fixed-effects factors were oddball (yes or no),
event structure (repeated, coherent, or incoherent), event familiarity (familiar or unfamiliar), and
actual duration (6 s or 8 s). The covariate was formal musical training (had or had not received
training for at least 1 year). The random effects were subject (56 levels) and item (base chord
progression; four levels). The data consisted of 2688 normally distributed ratio scores, 15 of
which were identified as outliers using the generalized extreme studentized deviate method, and
excluded from the analysis. The final converged model included the random slope of oddball
with the subject grouping variable, and the random slopes of event structure and event familiarity
with the item grouping variable. Pseudo-R2 was .495; the intercorrelation coefficients for
subjects and items were .352 and .045, respectively.
All other aspects of the data analysis were identical to those of experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
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The temporal expansion hypothesis predicts that people will judge the chord sequences
that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not, regardless of whether people are engaged
in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing.
The RAM predicts that when people are engaged in relatively temporal information
processing, they will judge the chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter than those that
do not, but when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing, they will
judge the chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not.
Specifically, the RAM predicts that in the present experiment (a) people will reproduce
with musical imagery the repeated chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter, the
incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer, and the coherent chord sequences
that contain oddballs as neither shorter nor longer, than those that do not, and (b) people will
reproduce with musical imagery the familiar chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter,
but the unfamiliar chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer, than those that do not.
Moreover, the RAM predicts that the effects of event structure and event familiarity will
compound, such that (c) the finding that people reproduce with musical imagery the repeated
chord sequences that contain oddballs as shorter than those that do not will be more robust when
those chord sequences are familiar than when they are unfamiliar, and (d) the finding that people
reproduce with musical imagery the incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer
than those that do not will be more robust when those chord sequences are unfamiliar than when
they are familiar.
As predicted by the RAM, we found an omnibus oddball X event structure interaction,
F(2, 2535.68) = 8.02, p < .001 (see Figure 8). This interaction was driven by the difference between
the effects of oddballs on the repeated chord sequences and those on the incoherent ones, β =
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.0307, t (2535) = 3.66, SE = .0084, p < .001, and the difference between the effects of oddballs on
the repeated chord sequences and those on the coherent ones, β = .0272, t (2536) = 3.245, SE =
.0084, p = .001. People judged the repeated chord sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.912;
SD = 0.199) as shorter than those that did not (M = 0.946; SD = 0.192), t (349.3) = -2.72, SE =
.0124, p = .007, but the incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs (M = 0.901; SD =
0.195) as longer than those that did not (M = 0.929; SD = 0.203), t (349.8) = 2.24, SE = .0124, p =
.026; the difference between the subjective duration of the coherent chord sequences that
contained oddballs and those that did not was not significant. These findings show how oddballs
shorten the subjective of intervals when people are engaged in relatively temporal information
processing (repeated chord sequences), but lengthen the subjective of intervals when people are
engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing (incoherent chord sequences).
Although the oddball X event structure X event familiarity interaction was not
significant, people reproduced with musical imagery the repeated chord sequences that contained
oddballs (M = 0.918; SD = 0.189) as shorter than those that did not (M = 0.957; SD = 0.175)
when they were familiar, t(1018) = -2.301, SE = .0172, p = .022, but this difference was not
significant when they were unfamiliar (see Figure 9). This result offers an additional piece of
evidence to support the RAM, suggesting that familiar repeated sequences facilitate temporal
information processing more effectively than unfamiliar ones.
Similar to experiment 1, in line with Vierordt’s law, we found a main effect of duration,
F(1, 2.06) = 35.53, p = .026. People judged the 8 s chord sequences (M = 0.881; SD = 0.248) as
shorter than the 6 s ones (M = 0.965; SD = 0.252), β = -.0419, SE = .0071.
No effect of formal musical training emerged. We found similar patterns of results when
analyzing these data with the outliers included.
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General Discussion
Summary
Empirical research has advanced our understanding of psychological time. Findings
continue to be contradictory, however, and debates between major schools of thought are
ongoing. The present research aimed to test the competing predictions of the temporal expansion
hypothesis and the RAM. The temporal expansion hypothesis predicts that the inclusion of
oddballs in intervals will lengthen subjective duration. But the RAM predicts that the inclusion
of oddballs in intervals will both shorten and lengthen subjective duration, depending on the
degree to which people are engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information
processing. We varied whether intervals were composed of chord sequences did or did not
contain oddballs, and manipulated the degree to which people were engaged in relatively
temporal or nontemporal information processing by varying response type, event structure, and
event familiarity.
Experiment 1 revealed a robust oddball X response type interaction. In line with the
predictions of the RAM, oddballs shortened subjective duration when people were making verbal
estimations (relatively temporal information processing), but lengthened subjective duration
when people were making musical imagery reproductions (relatively nontemporal information
processing).
Both experiment 1 and experiment 2 revealed significant oddball X event structure
interactions. Again in line with the RAM, oddballs shortened subjective duration when people
were presented with repeated chord sequences (relatively temporal information processing), but
lengthened subjective duration when people were presented with incoherent chord sequences
(relatively nontemporal information processing).

43
The oddball X event structure interaction in experiment 1 appeared to be specific to the
musical imagery reproductions, and the oddball X event structure interaction found in
experiment 2 (where people only made musical imagery reproductions) was more robust than
that found in experiment 1. Hence, the influence of event structure on the effects of oddballs on
the subjective duration of intervals seems to emerge primarily when people make musical
imagery reproductions. This makes sense because musical event structure is more cognitively
salient when people imagine music than when they do not (as was the case in the verbal
estimation condition in experiment 1). This conclusion is of course tentative because the oddball
X event structure X response type interaction in experiment 1 was not significant.
We did not find an oddball X event familiarity interaction in experiment 2. Block et al.
(2010) can explain this null finding. These researchers conducted a meta-analysis of over 100
experiments and found that event familiarity did not affect time judgments in prospective
experiments (such as the ones under current investigation). Block et al. reasoned that familiarity
both frees attentional resources by facilitating information processing and consumes attentional
resources by increasing memory search and the amount of retrievable associations. In this way,
the contradictory influences of familiarity on the allocation of attentional resources effectively
cancel each other out. This may also explain why other researchers have found weak or no
effects of stimulus familiarity (see Schiffman & Bobko, 1977).
An alternative explanation for why we found no effect of event familiarity is that event
familiarity, as a factor, does not effectively manipulate the degree to which people are engaged
in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing—that the confirmation of veridical
expectations does not facilitate temporal information processing as effectively as the
confirmation of schematic expectations (such as ones manipulated by varying event structure). It
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is also possible that the particular way in which we manipulated event familiarity was not strong
enough to produce any meaningful influence on the effects of oddballs.
To preserve experimental control, we were limited to exposing people to excerpts during
their laboratory session. We ran a preliminary study to determine that 12 randomly-ordered
repetitions of each unique chord sequence was sufficient to make the chord sequences that had
been included in an exposure phase significantly more familiar than ones that had not. However,
the pilot study exposure phase included 144 chord sequences, whereas experiment 2 included
288 chord sequences. It might be the case that 12 repetitions are enough to familiarize people
with chord sequences when the exposure phase includes only 144 chord sequences, but not when
the exposure phase includes 288 chord sequences. Also, the exposure phase in experiment 2
lasted over 33 min—boredom and fatigue might have made it especially difficult to listen
carefully to every chord sequence.
It is also possible that experimental exposure phases, themselves, might not be able to
make music familiar enough to influence information processing in any reliable ways. People
become deeply familiar with favorite songs over hundreds of listenings over many years.
Researchers studying the effects of preexposure, latent inhibition, and similarity on subjective
duration have noted that multiple preexposures are required for significant subjective durationdistorting effects to emerge (Zakay, 1989; see also Kowal, 1987). Future research might benefit
from using preexisting music with which people are maximally familiar.
The event structure X response type interaction in experiment 1 showed that the repeated
chord sequences were reproduced with musical imagery, but not verbally estimated, as longer
than both the coherent and incoherent ones. Brown and Boltz (2002) found similar results when
varying mental workload and musical event structure. Both of their experiments were
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prospective, hence participants were engaged in relatively temporal information processing.
Although greater mental workload and incoherent event structure compounded to shorten
subjective duration, the incoherent melodies were not judged as shorter than the coherent ones.
The present research adds to these findings by showing how repeated, in addition to coherent and
incoherent, musical sequences affect subjective duration. The repeated chord sequences in
experiment 1 were reproduced with musical imagery as longer (more accurate) than both the
coherent and incoherent ones.
The reason that we did not find an event structure X response type interaction in
experiment 2, as we did in experiment 1, appears to be that only in experiment 2 were the
repeated chord sequences that contained oddballs reproduced with musical imagery as shorter
than those that did not. Experiment 2 included a familiarity exposure phase that served to
facilitate temporal information processing, whereas experiment 1 did not. Moreover, in
experiment 2, only the difference between the familiar repeated chord sequences in experiment 2
that contained oddballs and those that did not was significant. This latter finding lends the
possibility that the repeated sequences and the familiarity exposure phase compounded to
facilitate temporal information processing.
Schiffman and Bobko (1977) similarly studied the potential compounding effects of
repetition and familiarity, and alsofound no significant effects. These researchers presented
participants color transparencies that contained either homogenous familiar, heterogeneous
familiar, or heterogeneous unfamiliar stimuli. The homogenous familiar stimuli, analogous to the
familiar repeated chord sequences in the present studies, were repeated household items (e.g., a
series of eight identical apples); the heterogeneous familiar stimuli, comparable to the familiar
incoherent chord sequences in the present studies, were assorted household items (e.g., table,
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pencil, light bulb); the heterogeneous unfamiliar stimuli, comparable to the unfamiliar incoherent
chord sequences in the present experiments, were assorted unrecognizable items. Participants
prospectively reproduced the durations of the slides (5 s, 9 s, 13 s, 17 s). Schiffman and Bobko
found no effects of familiarity, reasoning that their manipulation of familiarity might have not
been effective. These findings further suggest that researchers must produce strong
manipulations of familiarity to find subjective duration-distorting effects.
In experiment 2, we found a main effect of duration, such that the 8 s chord sequences
were more underestimated than the 6 s ones. We found a similar result in experiment 1, but the
main effect of duration was characterized by a duration X response type interaction. The 12 s
chord sequences were judged as longer than the 7 s ones when they were reproduced with
musical imagery, but not when they were verbally estimated. This indicates that the tendency for
underestimations to strengthen as actual duration lengthens (for relatively long durations) is more
pronounced when people make musical imagery reproductions than when they make verbal
estimations. This speaks to the accuracy of verbal estimations, and their resistance to an
underestimation bias. People can more easily make verbal estimations about relatively long
intervals than they can musical imagery reproductions. The energy required to make
reproductions, in general, is a function of the actual duration of the to-be-judged interval.
Whereas the amount of time it takes to make reproductions lengthens as the durations of the
actual intervals lengthen, the amount of time it takes to make verbal estimations do not—it takes
no longer to verbally report “22 s” than it does to report “2 s.” Overall, these effects of duration
show how relatively long intervals are underestimated to a greater degree than relatively short
ones, a finding both in line with Vierordt’s law and expected in time estimation research.
Theoretical Implications
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Time estimation models. Both attention- and memory-based models make accurate
predictions about subjective duration, but in different contexts. Attention-based models predict
oddballs will shorten subjective duration. We found that oddballs shortened subjective duration
when people made verbal estimations and were presented with repeated chord sequences, both of
which facilitate temporal information processing. Memory-based models, on the other hand,
predict oddballs will lengthen subjective duration. We found that oddballs lengthened subjective
duration when people made musical imagery reproductions and were presented with incoherent
chord sequences, both of which facilitate nontemporal information processing.
It is no coincidence that in the present experiments, the attention-based model predictions
were accurate when people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing, whereas
the memory-based model predictions were accurate when people were engaged in relatively
nontemporal information processing—these patterns of results fit nicely with the tenets of the
RAM. The present research manipulated event structure and response type independently. We
found some evidence that they interacted to influence the effects of oddballs on subjective
duration, but further research is needed to show how factors that manipulate the degree to which
people engage in temporal and nontemporal information processing might interact. Discovering
interactions of this sort would further support the proposition of the RAM and dynamic attending
theory that temporal and nontemporal information processing are interdependent.
Dynamic attending theory. The collection of studies investigating the tenets of dynamic
attending theory have manipulated temporal coherence by varying pitch sequences to show how
event structure can directly influence subjective duration. We added uniquely to this effort. We
manipulated harmonic coherence by varying chord sequences to show event structure can
indirectly influence subjective duration. Our findings contribute to the literature surrounding
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dynamic attending theory by suggesting that (a) variations in the structural characteristics of
chord, in addition to pitch, sequences can affect subjective duration, (b) event structure can have
indirect, in addition to direct, effects on subjective duration, and (c) the manipulation of
temporal, but not harmonic, accents might be needed in order to find direct effects of coherent
versus incoherent event structure on subjective duration.
We found an indirect effect of event structure on subjective duration, such that the effects
of oddballs on the subjective duration of intervals were contingent upon the event structure of the
chord sequences filling those intervals. We did not find a direct effect of event structure on
subjective duration between the coherent and incoherent sequences—there were no differences
between the subjective duration of the coherent and incoherent chord sequences—suggesting that
the manipulation of temporal accents has a more robust effect on subjective duration than the
manipulation of harmonic ones. Temporal accents have been manipulated by varying the
durations of individual pitches in melodies—such that pitches range from dotted half notes to
eighth notes (see Boltz, 1991, 1998; Jones & Boltz, 1989). A temporal accent is created when a
musical event has a relatively long duration. In our experiments, the chord sequences did not
have temporal accents because each musical event had the same duration.
Dynamic attending theory emphasizes the role that event structure plays in time
estimation, and the role that attending level plays in information processing. Analytic attending
involves focusing on relatively low-level properties of stimuli. Examples of analytic attending
include focusing on each individual event in a sequence as they occur and focusing on the timbre
of someone’s voice as they speak. Future-oriented attending, in contrast, involves focusing on
relatively high- level structural relationships between temporal and nontemporal properties of
events. Future-oriented attending takes place, for example, when people both listen to someone
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talk and anticipate when they will finish talking, as is done in order to make an appropriately
timed response. Future-oriented attending also occurs when we both listen to musical sounds and
anticipate the close of musical phrases, such as anticipating the occurrence of tonics following
dominants. Future-oriented attending is tightly linked with expectation. We engage in futureoriented attending when we can make predictions about both what events will occur and when
they will occur. Coherent event structures facilitate future-oriented attending. Incoherent event
structures facilitate analytic attending—people cannot engage in future-oriented, or expectationinformed, attending if there exists no coherent structure from which to form expectations about.
Jones and Boltz (1989) would argue that people were engaged in future-oriented
attending during the presentation of the coherent chord sequences in the present experiments.
When coherent sequences contained oddballs, the oddballs violated the expectations activated by
future-oriented attending. Thus, oddballs in coherent chord sequences not only violated
expectations about event probability—oddballs are salient, attention-capturing, low-probability
expectancy violations—but also schematic and veridical expectations about musical structure.
The oddballs in the coherent sequences created temporal contrasts. A temporal contrast is created
when an actual outcome is different from an expected outcome. In the coherent chord sequences
that contained oddballs, expected outcomes about the structure of the music were violated when
the oddballs occurred.
In the incoherent chord sequences in the current studies, people were engaged in analytic
attending. Here, the oddballs only violated expectations about probability—there existed no
future-oriented expectations to violate. The temporal contrasts created by oddballs in the
incoherent chord sequences were theoretically weaker than those created by oddballs in the
coherent chord sequences. If oddballs constituted weaker expectancy violations in the incoherent
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compared to coherent chord sequences, then we should have found that the inclusion of oddballs
in the chord sequences had a relatively robust effect on the coherent chord sequences. We found
effects to the contrary: the incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs were judged as
longer than those that did not more often than the coherent chord sequences that contained
oddballs were judged as longer than those that did not.
Dynamic attending theory can nonetheless account for this pattern of results by
highlighting the role of perceptual grouping, or chunking: The incoherent chord sequences were
affected by oddballs to a greater degree than the coherent ones because the incoherent ones
facilitated perceptual chunking more than the coherent ones. People used analytic attending (e.g.,
chunking each chord as an event) when listening to the incoherent chord sequences, but used
future-oriented attending (e.g., chunking each musical phrase as an event) when listening to the
coherent ones. In this way, people might have imagined the incoherent chord sequences as
having relatively many chunks, thereby producing relatively long musical imagery
reproductions.
Another possible reason why oddballs had a greater effect on the incoherent, compared to
coherent, chord sequences is that attending level shifted in the coherent ones, but did not shift in
the incoherent ones. In the coherent chord sequences, oddballs shifted the level of attending from
future-oriented to analytic, and thus violated any future-oriented musical expectations that may
have formed leading up to the occurrence of the first oddball. In the incoherent chord sequences,
on the other hand, oddballs did not shift the level of attending—attending was analytic both
before and after the occurrence of the first oddball.
Attending level shifts can affect memory, and musical imagery reproductions involve
retrieving and rehearsing information from memory. If people listened to the coherent chord
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sequences that did not contain oddballs with future-oriented attending, then they likely
remembered and imagined them with that same future-oriented attending. But when these
coherent chord sequences contained oddballs, future-oriented attending was disrupted and shifted
to analytic attending. Accordingly, imaginings of those sequences were likely disrupted and
fragmented, producing relatively short and inaccurate musical imagery reproductions. In
contrast, if people listened to both the incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs and
those that did not with only analytic attending, then they likely remembered and imagined both
with analytic attending. In this way, memory for the incoherent chord sequences that contained
oddballs was not as disrupted and fragmented as memory for the coherent ones, thus producing
relatively long and accurate musical imagery reproductions.
Dynamic attending theory can also provide an explanation for the present finding that the
coherent and incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs were judged as longer than
those that did not. Jones and Boltz (1989) showed that musical melodies that were
experimentally manipulated to seem to end later than expected—by changing the event structure
of pitch sequences—were duration reproduced as longer than melodies that were manipulated to
seem to end on time. Likewise, they showed that melodies that seemed to end too soon were
duration reproduced as shorter than those that seemed to end on time. If, in the present research,
the inclusion of oddballs made the chord sequences seem to end too late, then this might explain
why the chord sequences that contained oddballs were reproduced with musical imagery as
longer than those that did not.
There are a number of reasons why the inclusion oddballs in the present experiments
might have made the chord sequences seem to end too late. People might have formed the
veridical expectation that the chord sequences will end after the occurrence of the first oddball—
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the final event of all of the chord sequences that contained oddballs was always an oddball, not a
chord. The 3.5 s chord sequences contained only one oddball, which closed the sequence. The 7 s
and 12 s chord sequences, in contrast, contained multiple oddballs. Where people might have
expected the the 7 s and 12 s sequences to end upon the occurrence of the first oddball, the
sequences continued to play chords, perhaps seeming to play for too long, or seeming to end too
late.
Future research might explore this possibility by including only one oddball in all of the
chord sequences, or by varying whether or not the final event of the chord sequences is an
oddball or a chord. If people do veridically expect oddballs to close sequences, then sequences
that end with chords—regardless of whether or not they contain oddballs—should be reproduced
as shorter than those that end with oddballs. Of course, sequences can be made to seem to end
too early by manipulating event structure, itself. For example, ending sequences on dominant,
rather than tonic, chords should leave the schematic expectation that tonics close musical phrases
unfulfilled, and thus make sequences seem to end too early and be judged as relatively short.
Dynamic attending theory and repeated sequences. The present research offers the
unique opportunity to discuss the tenets of dynamic attending theory in the novel context of
repeated sequences, and the role of expectations for repeated events, in general. The repeated
chord sequences in the present research were all the same—they all consisted of a repeated C
Major chord. Do repeated sequences such as these facilitate analytic or future-oriented
attending? To answer this question, let us consider how repeated sequences might affect musical
expectations. Do repeated sequences confirm or violate musical expectations? Do they
differentially manipulate schematic and veridical expectancies?
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On the one hand, the repeated sequences in the present research violated the schematic
expectation that, in general, music will progress. People enculturated to music in western society
schematically expect music to change over time—people rarely hear single musical events
repeated on end. On the other hand, the repeated sequences in the present research confirmed the
veridical expectation that the repeated sequences in this particular experiment will repeat. People
presented with the repeated sequences heard a C Major chord followed by the same C Major
chord, again and again. Each subsequent C Major chord confirmed the veridical expectation that
the next chord in the sequence would be the same as the one before it. Repeated sequences in the
current research thus manipulated schematic and veridical expectations in opposite ways. The
repeated sequences violated deeply-engrained schematic expectations about western tonal music,
in general, while confirming locally-created veridical expectations about the particular chord
sequences in these experiments. The repeated sequences allowed people to anticipate that each
subsequent chord in the sequence would be the same: C Major. Furthermore, the chords had an
isochronous periodicity—each had the same duration—and people tend to impose subjective
accent structures on isochronous sequences (Boltz, 1992, 1994; Fraisse, 1956; Povel, 1981).
People in the present studies were able to predict when each subsequent chord would occur. In
this way, the repeated sequences offered both high nontemporal predictability about occurrence
of the C Major chord, and high temporal predictability about occurrence of that chord at a
regular beat period.
To engage in future-oriented attending, people must be able to predict (a) what events
will occur, (b) when they will occur, and (c) when the event sequence will end. The present
repeated sequences, although offering high temporal predictability about the “what” and the
“when” of each subsequent event, did not offer the ability to predict ending time.14 Because the
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ability to predict ending time is a necessary condition for future-oriented attending, as described
by Jones and Boltz (1989), the repeated chord sequences in the present research should have
facilitated analytic attending.
This conclusion is in line with the tenets of dynamic attending theory, attention-based
models of time estimation, and the RAM, and fits with the findings of the current experiments.
Dynamic attending theory posits that future-oriented attending requires being able to anticipate
ending times of sequences. Since people in the present research were not able to do so with the
repeated sequences, they instead were engaged in analytic attending. When people engage in
analytic attending, they focus, among other things, on “counting” each subsequent event.
Attention-based models, as well as the RAM, assert that people engaging in counting
mechanisms in prospective paradigms (as was the paradigm of the present research) are engaging
in temporal information processing; for example, people might treat each counted event as a
subjective duration temporal unit, or a second. When people are engaged in temporal information
processing, furthermore, attention-capturing events should shorten subjective duration. This is
what we found in experiment 2. Attention-capturing events in the present research—oddballs—
shortened the subjective duration of the repeated chord sequences.
It is possible that the absence, not presence, of oddballs lengthened the subjective
duration of the repeated chord sequences in the present studies. The repeated chord sequences
that did not contain oddballs may have seemed to last too long because they violated the
schematic expectation that music, in general, will progress. Unfulfilled expectations about
harmonic change—that the C Major chord will change to a different chord—might have made
the sequences seem to last longer than they should have, or end too late. Also, this sort of
delayed gratification—and ultimately unfulfilled expectation—for harmonic change might have
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enhanced feelings of frustration, which itself can directly lengthen subjective duration (D. T.
Miller, 1978).
It is also possible that people were more bored when present with the repeated chord
sequences that did not contain oddballs than people were when presented wit those that did
contain oddballs. Boredom can emerge when nontemporal information processing load is
relatively low (Zakay, 2014). Boring activities or circumstances increase desires to withdraw,
and awareness to the passage of time (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Boredom lengthens subjective
duration—boring experiences seem to last longer than engaging ones. It is possible that the
repeated chord sequences that did not contain oddballs in the present research enhanced feelings
of boredom—repeated sequences are processed relatively efficiently and consume relatively few
attentional resources. Boredom, then, could have directly lengthened the repeated sequences by
increasing desires to withdraw from the task, or indirectly lengthened subjective duration by
making the repeated sequences seem to go on for too long, or end too late.
Dynamic attending theory and the RAM. It is important to discuss the relationship
between temporal and nontemporal information, temporal and nontemporal information
processing, and structural coherence. Jones and Boltz (1989) assert that the degree to which
temporal information is compatible with nontemporal information is a critical factor in time
estimation, yet is often overlooked. Much of the existing time estimation research investigates
how nontemporal information influences subjective duration. Researchers should also consider
the role of temporal information. Nontemporal information can be organized in time in different
ways, and the degree to which these organizations are coherent can influence subjective duration.
When do nontemporal events occur in time? How are nontemporal events ordered in time? What
are the durations of each nontemporal event, and how does each of their durations correspond
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with their positions in event sequences? All of these questions concern temporal properties of
nontemporal stimuli in our environment. These temporal properties are important to consider,
control for, and examine in time estimation research.
When nontemporal events have compatible temporal properties, people no longer
perceive them as nontemporal events in isolation, but as nontemporal events informed by their
temporal properties. When people order words in ways that form coherent sentences, we no
longer perceive word sequences as groups of individual nontemporal verbal events, but rather as
coherent utterances intended to communicate semantic meaning. When chords are ordered in
ways that follow the rules of western tonal harmony, we no longer perceive them as individual
nontemporal chordal events, but rather as coherent musical phrases. Future-oriented attending
allows us to make sense of our environment by perceiving structurally coherent stimuli as
nontemporal stimuli informed by their corresponding temporal properties. Dynamic attending
theory asserts that temporal and nontemporal information are tightly linked—that people engage
in an interdependent level of both temporal and nontemporal information processing—in
coherent environments.
We argue that the RAM is compatible with dynamic attending theory. The RAM treats
the distinction between temporal and nontemporal information processing as merely relative, and
acknowledges that both the temporal and nontemporal processors are activated when perceiving
coherent stimuli. As Zakay stated:
The weight assigned to specific information derived from either P(t) [the temporal
processor] or P(m) [the nontemporal processor] is a function of the degree of
attentiveness of the processor. . . . Temporal information processing takes place at all
times, but it is done intermittently when cognitive capacity is not directly focused at P(t);
hence, under such conditions, P(t) is assigned a low degree of attentiveness.” (1993, p.
658)
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The RAM defines engaging in temporal information processing as attending to high
amounts of temporal information, relative to nontemporal information—certain amounts of
nontemporal information are still perceived and processed. The same is true for the way in which
the RAM defines engaging in nontemporal information processing, or when people attend to
relatively high amounts of nontemporal information, relative to temporal information.
The types of temporal information processing outlined by the RAM and that outlined by
dynamic attending theory are similar in that both involve attending to temporal information, but
both differ in important ways: The RAM refers to temporal information processing as that which
occurs when people track duration by counting changes, such as seconds. This is usually the case
in prospective paradigms, when people track the passage of time in preparation for upcoming
duration judgments. Dynamic attending theory, on the other hand, refers to temporal information
processing as that which occurs when people attend to temporal information, in general, not
necessarily for the sake of tracking the passage of time—such as when focusing on the rhythm of
a coherent musical song for the sake of listening to music.
Counting seconds and attending to musical rhythm are not mutually exclusive behaviors,
and both involve attending to temporal information, but they are unique in important ways. Each
seem to occur under different circumstances. People often focus on the passage of time when
asked to judge duration in time estimation experiments, or when engaged in boring, frustrating,
or undesirable activities. People often attend to musical rhythm, on the other hand, when
listening to, imagining, or performing coherent music. Moreover, focusing on the rhythm of a
coherent song facilitates more nontemporal information processing than counting seconds
because nontemporal musical properties, such as pitches, timbres, and contour changes, are
tightly linked with temporal musical properties (Jones & Boltz, 1989).
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In line with the RAM and dynamic attending theory, we treated the distinction between
temporal and nontemporal information processing in the present research as relative. Participants
were engaged in relatively temporal information processing when making verbal estimations,
and in relatively nontemporal information processing when making musical imagery
reproductions. Participants were engaged in relatively temporal information processing when
listening to repeated chord sequences, and in relatively nontemporal information processing
when listening to coherent and incoherent chord sequences. We found that chord sequences that
contained oddballs were judged as shorter than those that did not when people were engaged in
relatively temporal information processing, and judged as longer than those that did not when
people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing. The present research is
in line with both the RAM and dynamic attending theory, suggesting that temporal and
nontemporal information processing are interdependent.
Subjective temporal and nontemporal units. The present investigation found consistent
support for the RAM. Nevertheless, when considered in isolation, some of the present findings
can be considered as support for the temporal expansion hypothesis. The temporal expansion
hypothesis predicts that people will judge chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer than
those that did not, and this is what we found when people were engaged in relatively
nontemporal information processing. This finding lends the possibility that the temporal oddball
illusion is driven by nontemporal, rather than temporal, information processing. Oddball events
might be judged as longer than standard events because oddballs increase attention to the
oddballs’ nontemporal, rather than temporal, properties.
This possibility is compatible with the temporal expansion hypothesis. Tse et al. (2004)
theorize that oddballs are judged as longer than standards for the following reasons: An oddball

59
captures attention and increases the amount of attentional resources allocated to that oddball,
relative to a standard. This enhancement of attention to the oddball increases the rate at which
information is processed while perceiving the oddball. Because the rate of information
processing increases, the number of “subjective temporal units” stored and counted by a
cognitive timer increases. A higher number of units stored and counted during the perception of
an oddball than during the perception of a standard makes the oddball seem longer than the
standard, or expands the subjective duration of the oddball.
Tse et al. (2004) base the mechanisms driving the temporal oddball illusion on the tenets
of attention-based models of short interval time estimation, ones that assert the existence of a
counter mechanism that accumulates and tallies the number of subjective temporal units stored in
an accumulator (Thomas & Weaver, 1975; Treisman, 1963). These attention-based models
predict that attention-capturing stimuli will shorten subjective duration, because when stimuli
capture attention, more attention is focused on the nontemporal aspects of the stimuli and less
attention is focused on the passage of time. When attention is distracted from the passage of
time, the accumulation of subjective temporal units are missed, and fewer units are stored and
counted.
Tse et al. (2004) suggest that attention-capturing stimuli can, at the same time as they
shorten subjective duration by distracting attention from the passage of time, lengthen subjective
duration by increasing the “rate of information processing” of an individual event. When an
event captures more attention, it increases the amount of information about that event that is
processed. This increases the amount of “subjective temporal units” stored and counted, and thus
lengthens the subjective duration of that event. Crucially, Tse et al. liken these subjective
temporal units to those articulated by the attention-based models of time estimation, arguing that
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attention-capturing stimuli (a) decrease the amount of subjective temporal units stored and
counted by decreasing the amount of attention allocated to the passage of time, and also (b)
increase the amount of subjective temporal units stored and counted by increasing the amount of
attention allocated to individual nontemporal stimulus events. This proposition might, of course,
be contradictory. How can the types of subjective units accumulated in these two scenarios be
the same?
To resolve the contradiction stated above, we merged the methodologies of the short
interval time estimation and timing literatures and provide evidence to support the proposition
that these two scenarios involve the accumulation of essentially different types of information:
The former scenario involves the accumulation of subjective temporal units; the latter, subjective
nontemporal information. More subjective temporal units are stored and counted when attending
to the passage of time by counting seconds and tracking the passage of time. More subjective
temporal units are units inferred directly from attending to the passage of time. More subjective
nontemporal information, on the other hand, is stored in memory when increasing the rate of
information processing of a nontemporal stimulus event; increasing the intensity or loudness of
an event, the emotional salience of an event, the level of arousal elicited by an event, or the
salience of an expectancy violation, such as an oddball, might increase the rate of information
processing and thus nontemporal information stored in memory.
When people are required to make duration judgments retrospectively, or duration
judgments about individual subsecond events, subjective nontemporal information is inferred
based on the amount of time-unrelated information perceived and remembered. This is because
when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing, they accumulate
relatively few subjective temporal units from which to base duration judgments. People must
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thus resort to making inferences about time’s passage based on the available memory traces of
nontemporal information.
Oddballs can both distract attention from the passage of time (from the accumulation of
subjective temporal units such as seconds) and focus attention on the oddballs, themselves,
thereby increasing the rate at which the nontemporal properties of the oddballs are processed and
the increasing the amount of perceived and remembered subjective nontemporal information.
In the present research, oddballs decreased the number of subjective temporal units stored
and counted when people were engaged in relatively temporal information processing, thereby
shortening subjective duration. Oddballs also increased the amount of subjective nontemporal
information perceived and remembered when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal
information processing, thereby lengthening subjective duration. Specifically, oddballs decreased
the number of subjective temporal units stored and counted when people were making verbal
estimations, responses that require storing and counting seconds, and when people were
presented with repeated chord sequences, stimuli that are processed relatively efficiently and
leave relatively many attentional resources available to track time and count seconds. On the
other hand, oddballs increased the amount of subjective nontemporal information stored in
memory when people were making musical imagery reproductions, responses that encourage
attending to and rehearsing nontemporal musical properties, and when people were presented
with incoherent chord sequences, stimuli that violate expectations, are processed relatively
inefficiently, and leave relatively few attentional resources available to track time.
Our proposed distinction between subjective temporal units and subjective nontemporal
information is in line with memory-based models of time estimation, as well as the RAM. These
models posit that the more nontemporal information, contextual changes, or high-priority events
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perceived and remembered during an interval, the longer the subjective duration of that interval
should become (Block, 1990; Poynter, 1989). People infer the passage of time from nontemporal
information when temporal accents are unavailable or when relying on memory (Boltz, 1989,
1995), as is the case in retrospective designs (Block & Zakay, 1997; Zakay, 1993); people have
no temporal information from which to base duration judgments when time judgments are
requested retrospectively.
Participants often make hundreds of prospective, not retrospective, time judgments over
the course of timing experiments that examine the temporal oddball illusion. Nevertheless, the
implications of memory-based models, the RAM, and the present research—that duration
judgments about oddballs in timing studies are based on subjective nontemporal information,
rather than subjective temporal units—are compatible with the temporal expansion hypothesis.
Although oddballs in timing experiments investigating the temporal oddball illusion are
not judged retrospectively, they are judged as single events, and these events have relatively
short durations. These experiments require that people judge the durations of individual oddball
events. Oddballs that are found to be judged as reliably longer than standards are usually in the
range of the perceptual present, or no longer than 5 s. In fact, most conditions in each
experiment, as well as most experiments, use oddballs and standards that are shorter than 1 s.
Explicit counting serves as a useful time estimation strategy only for intervals that are longer
than 1 s (Grondin, Meilleur-Wells, & Lachance, 1999).
If people avoid using counting seconds as a strategy when judging the durations of
individual subsecond events, then they would not be able to accumulate subjective temporal units
based on seconds, and would thus have to rely on available subjective nontemporal information
stored in memory. This interpretation is in line with temporal expansion hypothesis because the
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temporal expansion hypothesis states that people base duration judgments about individual
events on the amount of perceptual—and, as we suggest, nontemporal—information processed.
Memory-based models of time estimation state that people base duration judgments about
intervals on the amount of nontemporal information processed. The present findings show how
both the temporal expansion hypothesis and memory-based models make similar predictions.
Both explain the effects of oddballs in the present experiments when people were engaged in
relatively nontemporal information processing.
Oddball expansion or standard contraction. There is an ongoing debate in the timing
literature between the temporal expansion hypothesis (Tse et al., 2004) and the temporal
contraction hypothesis (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007, 2008a,
2008b, 2012). Tse et al. (2004) argue that oddballs, or unpredictable events, expand subjective
duration. Pariyadath and Eagleman (2012) argue that standards, or predictable events, contract
subjective duration. The temporal contraction hypothesis is supported by studies examining
repetition suppression (see Henson & Rugg, 2003; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014;
Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008; Todorovic & de Lange, 2012).
Repeated stimuli increase neural efficiency. Pariyadath and Eagleman argue that subjective
duration in timing experiments is directly connected to neural activation, such that fewer neural
firings lead to shorter subjective experiences. Standards are judged as shorter than oddballs
because standards are more predictable, are processed more efficiently, and activate fewer neural
firings than oddballs.
Both the temporal expansion and contraction hypotheses predict that people will judge
the repeated and coherent chord sequences that contain oddballs in the present experiments as
longer than those that do not, but each make different predictions about the effects of oddballs on
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the incoherent chord sequences. The temporal expansion hypothesis predicts that people will
judge the incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs as longer than those that do not.
Oddballs expand subjective duration, hence the inclusion of oddballs in intervals should expand
the subjective duration of those intervals. Oddballs increase the number of subjective units stored
and counted, hence intervals that include oddballs should have more units stored and counted
than intervals that do not.
On the other hand, the temporal contraction hypothesis predicts that people will judge the
incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs as no differently than those that do not. This is
because the incoherent chord sequences used in the current experiments are unpredictable—
analogous to the unpredictable scrambled number sequences used in Pariyadath & Eagleman
(2007; e.g., 1—4—3—5—2). Pariyadath and Eagleman (2012) assert that neural responses are
not suppressed in response to unpredictable, scrambled sequences, as they are in response to
predictable, ordinal sequences—only predictable sequences contract subjective duration. There
were no predictable sequences in either the incoherent chord sequences that contain oddballs or
those that do not. Therefore, the temporal contraction hypothesis predicts that we will find no
difference between the subjective duration of the incoherent chord sequences that contain
oddballs and those that do not.
We found that incoherent chord sequences that contained oddballs were judged as longer
than those that did not in both experiments. If both the subjective duration of oddballs as
individual events and the subjective duration of oddballs that fill intervals operate under the same
mechanisms when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing, then the
present research lends evidence to support the temporal expansion hypothesis over the temporal
contraction hypothesis.
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Conclusion
We used a novel and covert measure of subjective duration—musical imagery
reproduction—to facilitate nontemporal information processing in two experiments. We found
consistent evidence in support of the RAM. The effects of attention-capturing, high-priority
events on the subjective duration of intervals in the present research depended on the degree to
which people were engaged in relatively temporal or nontemporal information processing.
Oddballs shortened the subjective duration of chord sequences when people were engaged in
relatively temporal information processing, but lengthened the subjective duration of chord
sequences when people were engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing. These
results are in line with the proposition made by dynamic attending theory and the RAM that
temporal and nontemporal information processing are interdependent.
In addition, we proposed that the temporal expansion hypothesis accurately accounts for
subjective duration when people are engaged in relatively nontemporal information processing,
and that oddballs are judged as longer than standards because oddballs increase the accumulation
of subjective nontemporal information, rather than "subjective temporal units." In line with this
proposal, the effects of oddballs on the subjective duration of the incoherent sequences in the
present experiments suggest that oddballs are judged as longer than standards because oddballs
expand subjective duration, and not because standards contract subjective duration.
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Footnotes

1

This is a tenet of Vierordt’s law. Vierordt’s law states that people tend to overestimate

relatively short intervals and underestimate relatively long intervals (see Lejeune & Wearden,
2009; van Rijn, 2016).
2

Instructions that do not explicitly state duration appear in the timing literature where studies

investigate implicit timing processes. Implicit measures of subjective duration emerge from
actions or behaviors (Turvey, 1977), such as running, speaking, and singing (Zelaznik, Spencer,
& Ivry, 2002); there is, moreover, an important distinction between explicit and implicit timing
processes (Coull & Nobre, 2008).
3

It is important avoid explicitly stating duration in instructions when manipulating information

processing in order to help prevent pre-trial awareness of duration, or temporal information
processing. Pre-trial awareness of duration is, after all, the distinguishing characteristic between
the two major paradigms used in time estimation experiments (prospective and retrospective),
and an important factor in time estimation research, in general.
4

Some short interval time estimation experiments have made musical imagery an integral part of

their duration reproductions (see Boltz, 1995, 1998, 1999; Brown & Boltz, 2002; Firmino &
Bueno, 2008, 2013, 2014; Firmino et al., 2009; Jones & Boltz, 1989). Nonetheless, their
experimental instructions explicitly state duration or time.
5

The processing of duration has much in common with the processing of other nontemporal

information, such as the physical length of stimuli (Zakay, Bibi, & Algom, 2014).
6

Imagination, after all, involves creating surface representations of deep structures stored in

long-term memory (Kosslyn, 1981).
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7

Time estimation delay affects information processing because temporal information is most

retrievable from memory and most relevant to duration judgments immediately following an
interval. The retrievability and relevancy of temporal information degrades as the time between
the end of an interval and the beginning of an estimation lengthens. This degradation can, of
course, be avoided by intentionally storing temporal information in long-term memory. But
researchers can prevent this by requiring that people perform distractor tasks during the delays
(Zakay & Fallach, 1984).
8

Time estimation delay refers to whether estimates are made immediately following the close of

an interval (immediate estimation) or after a given amount of time (remote estimation). Time
estimation reference refers to whether estimates are based on information stored in short-term
memory (absolute estimation) or long-term memory (relative estimations).
9

This latter finding supports attention-based models because the type of segmentation used in

this experiment did not affect nontemporal task demands or attention to the passage of time.
10

Task switching constitutes alternating attention between different types of task-related

stimulus information (e.g., colors or words; Gopher, Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000), and is an
important part of executive control (Shallice, 1994).
11

Oddballs are low-probability events; standards are high-probability events. Examples of an

oddball include a circle following a series of squares, or a high-pitched tone following a series of
low-pitched tones, where the squares and low-pitched tones are standards. Low-probability,
unexpected stimuli capture attention (Sokolov, 1963). Low-probability stimuli demand more
attentional resources than high-probability stimuli (Hon & Tan, 2013), and more attention to
stimuli lengthen the subjective duration of those stimuli (Seifried & Ulrich, 2011). Oddballs,
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furthermore, have been shown to involuntarily capture both bottom-up and top-down attentional
processes (Debener, Kranczioch, Herrmann, & Engel, 2002). Moreover, abrupt, novel, low- and
high-pitched events, such as oddballs, produce automatic activation of brain stem reflexes
(Goydke, Altenmüller, Möller, & Münte, 2004; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008) and physiological
processes, even in pre-birth infants (Lecanuet, 1996).
12

Sliding tones are especially salient because they exhibit motion (Brown, 1995).

13

We ran a pilot study to show that 12 repetitions were sufficient to make the chord sequences

familiar. In the pilot study, participants listened carefully to 144 randomly-presented chord
sequences in an initial exposure phase (12 unique chord sequences played 12 times each). Then
participants made familiarity ratings for each of 24 unique chord sequences (half of which were
presented in the exposure phase and half of which were not). The chord sequences that were
presented in the exposure phase were rated as significantly more familiar than those that were
not.
14

Expectations that C Major chords will occur at regular periods in time are distinct from

expectations about the likelihood that any given C Major chord in the sequence will be the last
sequential event. The coherent chord sequences offered relatively high temporal predictability
about sequence ending time because tonic chords (C Major) following dominant ones (G Major),
for instance, confirm schematic expectations and foreshadow musical phrase closure.
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Figures

Figure 1. Example of a repeated chord sequence

Figure 2. Example of a coherent chord sequence

Figure 3. Example of an incoherent chord sequence
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Figure 4. Example of a repeated chord sequence that contains oddballs
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Figure 5. Mean ratio scores (±1 SEM) for the chord sequences that contained oddballs and those
that did not as a function of response type in experiment 1

89

Figure 6. Mean ratio scores (±1 SEM) for the chord sequences that contained oddballs and those
that did not as a function of event structure in experiment 1

Figure 7. Mean ratio scores (±1 SEM) for the chord sequences that contained oddballs and those that did not as a function of
response type and event structure in experiment 1
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Figure 8. Mean ratio scores (±1 SEM) for the chord sequences that contained oddballs and those
that did not as a function of event structure in experiment 2

Figure 9. Mean ratio scores (±1 SEM) for the chord sequences that contained oddballs and those that did not as a function of event
structure and event familiarity in experiment 2
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Appendix
Research Compliance Approval, Experiments 1 and 2

